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APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County.
The Honorable Samuel A. Hoagland, District Judge, presiding.

Richard Alan Eppink, residing at Boise, Idaho; Jason D. Williamson, residing at New York,
New York; Kathryn M. Ali and Brooks Hanner, residing at Washington, D.C.; and Andrew
C. Lillie, residing at Denver, Colorado; for Appellants.
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at Boise, Idaho, for Respondents State of Idaho, Hon. Linda Copple Trout, Darrell G. Bolz,
Kimber Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep. Christy Perry.
Cally A. Younger, residing at Boise, Idaho, for Respondent Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter.
Daniel J. Skinner, residing at Boise, Idaho, for Respondents Sara B. Thomas and William
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
There is no question that Idaho's public defense system is constitutionally inadequate. Six

years ago, an independent report requested by Governor Otter's Criminal Justice Commission
found just that. R., p. 7, para. 1. Last year, Governor Otter declared publicly that Idaho's "current
method of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants does not pass constitutional
muster." R., p. 7, para. 2. The district court in this case itself observed that ·'[w]ithout a doubt ...
there are serious problems with public defense in Idaho that need to be addressed." R., p. 492.
Who bears responsibility to fix this broken system? The district court held that the Governor has
"direct supervisory authority over those responsible to establish standards for a constitutionally
sound public defense system," and that Idaho's statewide Public Defense Commission ("PDC")
is "specifically saddled with the responsibility of creating rules" to improve public defense in
Idaho. R., p. 485.
Yet, even with additional authority recently granted by statute, Defendants ("State") have
failed to implement actual change on the ground-in courtrooms across the state-where the
liberty of individual Idahoans hangs in the balance. Indeed, the PDC has failed to meet every one
of its clear, mandatory statutory deadlines. R., p. 24-25, para. 48-49; p. 497.
Due to these systemic statewide deficiencies, Plaintiffs and the proposed class they
represent have suffered the consequences of actual denial of counsel at critical stages of their
criminal proceedings, as well as constructive denial of counsel under circumstances long
recognized by the United States Supreme Court as ··so likely to prejudice the accused that the
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cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 658 (1984). As a result Plaintiffs have been locked up, forced to spend months in jail with
little or no access to an attorney, denied access to meaningful-if any-investigation into their
cases, delayed justice, and, in the case of the lead plaintiff: compelled to plead guilty in the face
of dwindling prospects for any adequate defense. R., p. 8-12, 27-33 para. 4-7, 63-84.
The structure of Idaho's public defense system itself results in ongoing pre-trial and
collateral harms to al I indigent defendants in Idaho, including actual denial of counsel during
initial court appearances and other critical stage proceedings, public defenders overloaded by
crushing caseloads, lack of meaningful access to appointed counsel, inadequate availability of
defense investigators and experts, inadequate training of public defenders, and control by county
commissioners untrained in the law and unequipped to supervise criminal law practice. R., p. 1417 para.12-20, p. 25-26 para. 53-59, p. 32 para. 101, p. 38-52 para. 103-53.
Plaintiffs allege that these problems are the result of state-level, systemic, and structural
deficiencies-not that they are sporadic problems present only in some instances. R., p. 38 para.
102. Through this appeal, Plaintiffs merely seek the opportunity to pursue discovery and present
substantive evidence to the trial court in support of their allegations.
Although the named plaintiffs' individual criminal cases illustrate many of the problems
faced by indigent defendants across the State, at the crux of Plaintiffs' Complaint are the larger,
structural deficiencies that plague Idaho's indigent defense system as a whole. The lower court's
analysis hinged, mistakenly, on the Supreme Court's analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in individual cases, as articulated in Strickland,~ Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), rather
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than on the Court's Cronic framework for analyzing structural denials of counsel. See R., p. 49192. The district court held that the case was therefore not justiciable, because Plaintiffs had not
yet been convicted or pursued appellate or post-conviction remedies. See R., p. 494.
Plaintiffs, however, pleaded in detail the pre-trial and collateral harm that Idaho's
deficient statewide system had already caused them. R., p. 52-54. They alleged with particularity
that those harms were a result of state-level, not county-level, failings, R., p. 55, and that the
deficiencies were not limited to the counties in which the named plaintiffs were prosecuted or to
those plaintiffs' specific cases. R., p. 12-17 para. 8-21, p. 25-26 para. 52-59, p. 37-52, para.

101-154. Further, Plaintiffs never alleged Strickland violations with regard to their individual
criminal cases; they specifically alleged systemic and constructive denial of counsel under

Cronic. R., p. 26 para. 59. Under Cronic, Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims, all of
which are ripe and appropriate for judicial review under the separation of powers doctrine.
The remedies Plaintiffs seek are fully within Defendants' power to provide. The district
court agreed that both the Governor and the PDC had "a more than sufficiently close connection
or nexus to the enforcement of public defense in Idaho." R., p. 485. The recent passage of House
Bill 504 by the Idaho Legislature makes that connection and enforcement power even clearer.
The district court's decision granting the State's Motion to Dismiss should be reversed.

B.

Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief on June

17, 2015. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. The district court heard oral argument on the
Motion to Dismiss on December 16, 2015, and issued its Memorandum Decision and Order
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Granting the Motion to Dismiss on January 20, 2016. Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal the
next business day after they received a copy of the district court's decision.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Where Plaintiffs expressly plead pre-trial, post-conviction, and ongoing harm due to
systemic statewide constitutional violations, caused by the Defendants' failure to act or
fulfill specific duties and powers and which they have the present authority to remedy,
have Plaintiffs adequately pleaded standing to sue?

B.

Where harm from those systemic, statewide constitutional violations has already occurred
and remains ongoing, is the case ripe for adjudication?

C.

Does the separation of powers doctrine prevent Idaho courts from protecting fundamental
individual constitutional rights, over which the executive and legislative branches have
no discretion?

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek attorney's fees from Defendants. S'ee I.R.C.P. 54(e); Idaho App. R. 41.
Idaho's private attorney general doctrine provides for recovery of attorney's fees in actions of
widespread importance to Idahoans. See Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 578, 682 P.2d 524,
531 ( 1984); see also I.C. § 12-121. In determining whether to award attorney's fees under the
doctrine, courts consider: (I) the strength or societal importance of the public policy indicated by
the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden
on the plaintiff, and (3) the number of people standing to benefit. Hellar, 160 Idaho at 578, 682
P.2d at 531 (awarding attorney's fees under the private attorney general doctrine in a case
brought to ensure that Idahoans were constitutionally represented in the state legislature).
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This case is an archetype in all three categories. First, this case raises issues of such great
societal importance that they have drawn attention from all three branches of government and
major media outlets both within and outside of Idaho, for over five years. Second, private
enforcement became necessary because Idaho officials failed for years to ensure the fulfillment
of the fundamental and essential rights at stake in this case: the Governor's Commission created
a committee, which recommended creating another committee, which recommended creating a
statewide commission, which has failed--even after a statutory mandate-to promulgate rules or
even make further recommendations. Only after Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit did Idaho see any
meaningful discussion of systemic refonn. The resultant burden on Plaintiffs is enormous.
Plaintiffs' counsel have spent over five years investigating the scope of the statewide crisis and
urging systemic reform without the need for litigation. The case calls for putative class counsel
to invest considerable time and resources into ensuring these fundamental rights are vindicated
as soon as possible. The number of people standing to benefit in this case includes every criminal
and juvenile defendant with pending charges throughout the state, plus all future criminal and
juvenile defendants in Idaho. Considering the gravity of the human and constitutional rights at
stake, the fact that all Idaho courts are inextricably tied to the day-to-day protection of those
rights in all of Idaho's courtrooms, and the number of Idahoans impacted, this case is among the
most historic this Court has ever decided. Plaintiffs are entitled to fees under the private attorney
general doctrine if they prevail on appeal.
In addition, the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, exists to
·'ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances." Hensley
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v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). This provision was
specifically intended "to authorize fee awards payable by the States when their officials are sued
in their official capacities." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-694 ( 1978). Under § 1988,
plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee" when they prevail on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 (internal quotation marks omitted). To be a "prevailing party"
under this statute, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain relief on the merits of the claim. Farner v.

Idaho Falls Sch. Dist. No. 91, 135 Idaho 337, 342, 17 P.3d 281, 286 (2000) (citing Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. I 03, 111 (1992)). Plaintiffs will be prevailing parties if the actual relief ordered
by the Court materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the State's
behavior in a way that would directly benefit the Plaintiffs. See Cunningham v. Wa(ford, 131
Idaho 841,843,965 P.2d 201,203 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-112). ff
Plaintiffs prevail in this case, they are entitled to recover full attorney's fees under § 1988
because their federal and state law claims are based on the same facts. See Farner, 135 Idaho
337, 342, 17 P.3d 281, 286 (2000) (reasoning that because a class of teachers' "federal claims
relied upon the same facts as their state law claims, the Teachers are entitled to recover their
attorney fees under § 1988"); Lowder v. Minidoka Cty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 331, 132 Idaho 834,
840-41, 979 P.2d 1192, 1198-99 (1999) (awarding attorney's fees under § 1988 for a successful
appeal of mixed state and federal claims); Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada Cty. Haus. Auth., 124 [daho
450, 454-55, 468, 860 P.2d 653, 657-58, 671 (1993) (same).
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Plaintiffs' claims aim to enforce fundamental constitutional rights being denied to
Idahoans to this day because of the State's prior insufficient efforts to address public defense in
Idaho. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees if they prevail in this appeal.
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review

This Court ·'makes every reasonable intendment in order to sustain a complaint against a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618, 213 P.3d
398, 403 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The issue at the motion to dismiss stage .. is
not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer
evidence to support the claims." Fuchs v. State, Dept. of Idaho State Police, Bureau of Alcohol

Beverage Control, 152 Idaho 626, 629, 272 P.3d 1257, 1260 (2012) (citation omitted). A
dismissal must be reversed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho
400, 405, 353 P.2d 782, 785 (1960).
The Court must liberally construe Plaintiffs' complaint and presume that all facts alleged
therein are true. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 376, 386 P.2d 964, 964 ( 1963). The
Court must also draw all inferences from the record in the plaintiffs' favor. ISEEO v. Evans, 123
Idaho 573, 578, 850 P.2d 724, 729 ( 1993) [hereinafter ISEEO I]. Only after the Court has drawn
all inferences in the plaintiffs' favor may it consider whether the complaint states a claim. Id.
And even then, this Court views dismissals under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) with disfavor, ''because the
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primary objective of the law is to obtain a determination of the merits of the claim.'' FVackerli, 82
Idaho at 404, 353 P.2d at 784.
Justiciability issues, including standing, ripeness, and separation of powers, present
questions of iaw over which this Court exercises free review. In re Jerome Cty. Bd. of Comm 'rs,
153 Idaho 298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, I 086 (2012); see Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,
639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). This Court also exercises free review over the constitutional
issues raised by this appeal. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558,561, 149 P.3d 833,836 (2006).

B.

Plaintiffs' Claims Are Justiciable
The district court's dismissal of the Complaint rested on three distinct justiciability

doctrines: standing, ripeness, and separation of powers. Two of those grounds, standing and
ripeness, were never raised, briefed, or argued by either side. Below, Plaintiffs explain the harm
and urgency that plainly establish their standing and why the constitutionality of Idaho's public
defense system is fully ripe for decision, all of which were evident from the Complaint. Further,
Plaintiffs maintain that the lower court's separation of powers rationale is a jarring departure
from this Court's precedents, and it is erroneous because this case is about fundamental
individual rights, not the exclusive discretionary functions of other branches of government.

1.

Plaintiffs Have Standing.

Unlike the federal courts, Idaho state courts are not constrained by any constitutional
·'case or controversy" limit on jurisdiction. Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Lawrence Denney, No. 43169,
2015 WL 7421342, at *3 (Idaho Nov. 20, 2015); see also Michael S. Gilmore, Standing Law in

Idaho: A Constitutional Wrong Turn, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 509, 511 (1995) ("Idaho appellate courts'
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adoption of federal standing principles ... is inconsistent with the common law, is not required
by the Idaho Constitution or by Idaho statute, is poor policy, and therefore should be
abandoned."). This Court, nevertheless, has looked to federal justiciability doctrine for guidance
in some cases. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL 7421342 at *3.
Because the Idaho Constitution lacks any "case or controversy" limitation, this Court
relaxes the standing requirements in cases raising significant constitutional questions. Coeur

d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL 7421342 at *3, *4. Thus, even a plaintiff who does not demonstrate
standing will be allowed to proceed where otherwise there may be no one else ready and willing
to enforce fundamental constitutional guarantees. Id. at *5. When analyzing standing at the
pleading stage, "[g]eneral factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct
may suffice," and the court will "presum[ e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts
that are necessary to support the claim." Jewel v. Nat 'l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir.
2011) (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,889); see also Fort Hall Landowners

All., Inc. v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1225 (D. Idaho 2006) ("[T]he injury
itself need be nothing more than a trifle.") (quoting Nat 'l Wildl(fe Fed'n v. Burford, 871 F.2d 849,
854 (9th Cir. 1989)); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 ( 1973) ("[A]n identifiable
trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle.").
Under the federal formulation, this Court has held that a petitioner must show "a distinct
palpable injury and fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the
challenged conduct." Coal.for Agric.
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s Future v.

Canyon Cty., No. 42756, 2016 WL 1133369, at

*3 (Idaho Mar. 23, 2016) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs, who have been locked up and denied
counsel both constructively and actually, satisfy these requirements.

a.

Injury-in-Fact

The district court's analysis of the injury-in-fact prong of the standing inquiry in this case
was rooted in a fundamentally flawed assumption: that a criminal defendant suffers harm as a
result of inadequate legal representation only after he or she has been convicted and sentenced.
The court wrote that because none of the Plaintiffs had yet been convicted or sentenced, ·'the
Court fail[ed] to see how the Plaintiffs have suffered an injury at the time the Complaint was
filed in this matter." R., p. 488-489.
This was error. First of all, the lower court was wrong as a factual matter. Before the
lower court's decision, lead plaintiff Tracy Tucker had been convicted and sentenced. Indeed,
Tucker expressly alleged in the Complaint that he had already pleaded guilty to a felony, after
spending three months in pre-trial detention without being able to communicate effectively or
consistently with his attorney and with no prospect of meaningful investigation into his case. R.,
p. 8, 52, para. 4, 156. Months before the district court's January 2016 decision, formal judgment
was entered against Tucker and he was sentenced to a suspended prison term of two years fixed,
plus two additional years indeterminate. See State v. Tucker, Bonner County case no. CR-20151172 (Aug. 3, 2015). Hence, even under the court's own erroneous standing analysis, the lead
plaintiff cleared the injury-in-fact bar. Cf !SEEO I, 123 Idaho at 578, 850 P.2d at 729 (holding
that in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts must draw all inferences
from both the pleadings in the plaintiffs' favor).
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Second, the Complaint expressly alleges actual denial of counsel at constitutionally
significant, ··critical" stages of the named Plaintiffs' criminal proceedings. R., p. 38-40, 52, 54,
para. I 03-114, 156, 157, 159. Actual denial of counsel at a critical stage causes such clear,
constitutional harm that a defendant need not show any prejudice to establish reversible error.

United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004). Actual denial of counsel also
results in the loss of pre-trial liberty interests. Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 930 N.E.2d 217, 223
(N.Y. 2010). In the Hurrell-Harring case out of New York, as in Idaho, criminal defendants were
not being represented at arraignment, when bail was first set-a .. critical stage" of the criminal
proceeding. Id. Actual denial of counsel at those critical stages has "most serious consequences,
both direct and collateral, including the loss of employment and housing, and inability to support
and care for particularly needy dependents." Id Idaho defendants, like those in New York, have
not only constitutional rights to counsel at critical stages, including initial appearance, but
express statutory rights as well. I.C. § I9-852(l)(a), (2)(a) ("An indigent person ... is entitled ..
. [t]o be counseled and defended at all stages of the matter beginning with the earliest time when
a person providing his own counsel would be entitled to be represented by an attorney .... ").
Actual denial of counsel at critical stages is a sufficient injury-in-fact.
Third, Plaintiffs expressly pleaded constructive denial of counsel in the Complaint. See
R., p. 26 para. 59. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that structural deficiencies in Idaho's indigent
defense system have created a situation in which it is functionally impossible for any public
defender, no matter how well-intentioned, to provide constitutionally adequate representation.
Such claims are not analyzed under the individualized ineffective assistance of counsel
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framework articulated in Strickland v. Washington. Rather, where structural deficiencies are
alleged, it is unnecessary to evaluate the outcome of any individual indigent defendant's case to
determine whether the Sixth Amendment has been compromised. Instead, as the Supreme Court
announced in Cronic, decided on the same day as Strickland, prejudice is presumed where the
system itself is constitutionally deficient:
There are, however, circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that
the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. . . .
Circumstances of that magnitude may be present on some occasions when
although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that
any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so
small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual
conduct of the trial.
466 U.S. at 658-660; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (acknowledging that there are
instances in which prejudice is "so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the
cost."). As Plaintiffs pleaded in the Complaint, Idaho's indigent defense system is emblematic of
the kind of circumstances described in Cronic. See, e.g., R., p. 25-27, para. 51-60.
Both federal and state courts that have considered constructive denial of counsel claims
under similar circumstances have recognized the inevitable and irreparable injury suffered by
indigent defendants as a result of systemic deficiencies in indigent defense delivery systems,
irrespective of the ultimate outcome of the individual cases at issue. See Wilbur v. City of Mount

Vernon, 989 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1131 (W.D. Wash. 2013); Lucky v. Harris, 860 F.2d IO 12, IO 17
(11th Cir. 1988); Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 222; Duncan v. Michigan, 774 N. W.2d 89
(Mich. Ct. App. 2009), ajJ'd on other grounds, 780 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 2010); Phillips v. State of
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California, No. l 5CECG02201, slip op. at 4-5 (Cal. Superior Ct. April 13, 2016) (appended as
an Exhibit to this brief).
In Wilbur, the court specifically rejected the notion that the only relevant inquiry was
whether the plaintiffs achieved a favorable outcome in their individual underlying criminal cases:
The Court does not dispute the fact that many, if not the vast majority, of the
plaintiff class obtained a reasonable resolution of the charges against them. The
problem is not the ultimate disposition: if plaintiffs were alleging that counsel
had affirmatively erred and obtained a deleterious result, the Sixth Amendment
challenge would have been brought under Strickland v. Washingon, rather than
Gideon v. Wainwright.
989 F.Supp.2d at 1127 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). The court emphasized
that its decision was based on a "system [that] is broken to such an extent that confidential
attorney/client communications are rare, the individual defendant is not represented in any
meaningful way, and actual innocence could conceivably go unnoticed and unchampioned." Id.
Hence, the court determined that the plaintiffs had "easily met" their burden of demonstrating
"irreparable injury and the inadequacy of available legal remedies," as required when seeking
injunctive relief. Id. at 1133. The court went on to explicitly explain the irreparable harm that a
deficient system causes to a criminal defendant, long before conviction or sentencing, noting that
·'the lack of an actual representational relationship and/or adversarial testing injures both the
indigent defendant and the criminal justice system as a whole." Id.
New York's highest court reached the same conclusion, recognizing that '·the absence of
representation at critical stages is capable of causing grave and irreparable injury to persons who
will not be convicted. Gideon's guarantee to the assistance of counsel does not turn upon a
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defendant's guilt or innocence, and neither can the availability of a remedy for its denial."
Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 227. The court held that under the Sixth Amendment, '·the period
between arraignment and trial when a case must be factually developed and researched, decisions
respecting grand jury testimony made, plea negotiations conducted, and pretrial motions filed"
also constitutes a critical stage during which criminal defendants will suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of counsel. Id. at 224 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985)).
Most recently, in Phillips, a California court rejected the State's argument that the
plaintiffs were required to satisfy the Strickland test in order to demonstrate the systemic failure
to provide counsel to indigent defendants. The court noted that the plaintiffs were not seeking to
challenge individual convictions, but rather a range of broader deficiencies that harm indigent
defendants in Fresno County, including excessive caseloads, lack of conflict-free representation,
inadequate opportunity for consultation, inadequate factual investigation, and lack of meaningful
adversarial testing. Phillips, slip op. at 5-6 (appended as an Exhibit to this brief). As such, the
court found that "plaintiffs need not plead and prove the elements of ineffective assistance as to
specific individuals in order to state a cause of action." Id. at 6.
Social science research corroborates the case law. Specifically, empirical research has
concluded that pre-trial detention has a tremendous impact on the outcome of a case, thereby
causing great hann to criminal defendants. For instance, a study released by the Arnold
Foundation in 2013 measured the impact of pre-trial detention on the case outcomes for over
153,000 defendants booked into a Kentucky jail over a one-year period. Most significantly, the
study found that pre-trial detention resulted in dramatically worse outcomes, including the fact
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that those "defendants who [were] detained for the entire pretrial period were 5.41 times more
likely to be sentenced to jail and 3.76 times more likely to be sentenced to prison'' as those who
were released at some point before trial or case disposition. 1 More generally, "[d]efendants who
are detained for the entire pretriai period receive ionger jail and prison sentences. Id. Hence,
pre-trial detention has a negative effect on the defendant's prospects, particularly as compared to
defendants who have spent less time in jail pre-trial. Plaintiffs expressly allege in the Complaint
that they have spent unnecessary time in pre-trial detention due to systemic deficiencies with
Idaho's public defense system. See R., p. 41-42, para. 115-118, p. 53-54, para. 156-159.
In concluding that pre-conviction harm is not real harm, the district court ignored the
significant and palpable injuries that Plaintiffs, and putative class members, suffer as a result of a
system infected with structural deficiencies. As Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint, the attorneys
charged with representing indigent defendants in Idaho face overwhelming caseloads, as well as
a lack of sufficient time, resources, training, and supervision. R., p. 42-47, para. 119-134. These
system-wide deficiencies hinder all attorneys who provide public defense services from
effectively representing their clients at critical stages of their cases. The systemic problems have
led to inability to communicate with their clients effectively and on a consistent basis, if at all; to
properly investigate their clients' cases, if at all; or to secure expert analysis and testimony that
could be essential to their clients' cases. See R. p., 37-52, para. 101-154. As a result of these
1

Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Ph.D., Marie VanNostrand, Ph.D., Alexander Holsinger, Ph.D.,
Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Investigating the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing
Outcomes 4 (November 2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/LJ AF_Report_state-sentencing_ FN L. pdf.
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deficiencies, Plaintiffs were deprived of effective bail advocacy at initial appearance, leading to
unnecessary time spent in pre-trial detention, the inability to participate meaningfully in their
own defense, and the loss of key witnesses and evidence, among other irreversible harm.
Moreover, the inability of Idaho public defenders to adequately develop cases not only
leads to increased pressure to plead guilty, even where the defendant is innocent or has other
compelling defenses, but also necessarily diminishes defense attorneys' ability to negotiate
favorable plea agreements. See, e.g., ·wilbur, 989 F. Supp.2d at 1127. In Maine v. Moulton, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that "to deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to
trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself." 474 U.S. at 170. The
critical importance of pre-trial advocacy is why the right to counsel '·attaches at earlier, 'critical'
stages in the criminal justice process 'where the results might well settle the accused's fate and
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.'" Id. (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs allege in the
Complaint, expressly and in detail, severe systemic deficiencies during these critical, pre-trial
stages.SeeR.,p.13-14,par a 11-14,p.38--42,para.103-1 18,p.46--47,para.131-134 .
Plaintiffs' allegations demonstrate harm in three ways: ( 1) pleading guilty due to
inadequate representation, resulting in conviction; (2) actual denial of counsel at critical stages;
and (3) constructive denial of counsel throughout their cases due to additional systemic
deficiencies with Idaho's statewide indigent defense system. These allegations far exceed the
injury-in-fact threshold. Compare the circumstances in Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term

Limits, where voters challenged a law requiring that the Idaho Secretary of State publish
information about candidates' adherence to term limits pledges. 135 Idaho 121, 123, 15 P.3d
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1129, 113 I (2000). The petitioners there alleged that the publication requirement "greatly
diminish[ed] the likelihood the candidate of their choice will prevail in the election.'' Id at 125,
15 P.3d at 1133. That allegation, together with the claim that the law violated the petitioners'
right to vote, was deemed sufficient to establish injury-in-fact. Id. Here, Plaintiffs plead far more,
and thus adequately plead standing.

b.

Causal Connection

The district court concluded that it is the State, not the counties, that "is ultimately
responsible for ensuring constitutionally-sound public defense" and that "the Governor and the
PDC members have a more than sufficiently close connection or nexus to the enforcement of
public defense in Idaho." R., p. 472,485 (emphasis added). But in a bizarre twist, the lower court
nevertheless concluded that "[t]he connection of the claimed injury"-violation of the Plaintiffs'
right to counsel-"to the Governor and the PDC [is] too remote to be fairly traceable." R., p.
490. To conclude that state officials have a sufficiently direct connection to Idaho's
unconstitutional system to be proper defendants, yet that Plaintiffs' injuries are not fairly
traceable to those officials' conduct in maintaining that system, is inherently contradictory.
Whether there is a sufficient connection for state officials to be proper defendants and whether
there is a sufficient causal connection to establish standing are "closely related-indeed
overlapping-inquir[ies]"; demonstrating one connection will, for the same reasons, demonstrate
the other. Culinary Workers Union, Local 226v. Del Papa, 200 F.3d 614,619 (9th Cir. 1999).
Furthermore, in conducting standing analysis, the defendants' conduct need not be a
"proximate" or "but for" cause of the alleged harms. Canyon Cty. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519
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F.3d 969, 974 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008); Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1983). Standing
exists even when the defendant indirectly harms the plaintiff. VVarth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504
(1975); see also Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, I 070 (9th Cir. 2011) (''A causal chain
does not fail simply because it has several ·links."'). Indeed, the causal chain between the
governor of California and litigation delays in Los Angeles County, which the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged seemed "tenuous," was sufficient to establish standing. Los Angeles Cty. Bar
Ass 'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 70 I (9th Cir. 1992). Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court found that a
group of five Washington, D.C.-area law students had established standing to sue the federal
government based on the causal chain between harm to the students' "use and enjoyment of
natural resources in the Washington area'' and an increase in federal rates for rail freight (because
the rate increase might have led to increased use of non-recyclable commodities, which in turn
might have resulted in greater depletion of natural resources). SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686.
Here, in comparison, the links are both plausible and direct: the Governor "has direct
supervisory authority over those responsible to establish standards for a constitutionally sound
public defense system" and the PDC is "specifically saddled with the responsibility of creating
rules" to regulate and improve public defense delivery throughout the state. R., p. 485. To the
extent there was any serious question regarding this issue, the Governor and Legislature's recent
enactment of House Bill 504 puts it to rest: effective July 1, 2016, the PDC, under LC. § 19-850,
is mandated to promulgate standards for public defense statewide and empowered to enforce
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them in each county. 2 Moreover, under LC. § 19-862A, the PDC may grant additional funds to
individual counties and/or directly take over public defense in a particular noncompliant county,
intercepting county revenue if necessary.
In addition, in faiiing to recognize Plaintiffs' allegations of systemic deficiencies in
Idaho's public defense system, the court mistakenly suggests that the individual counties (along
with the Legislature) are "the principle bodies with the power to affect the policy (political) and
systemic changes Plaintiffs seek." R., p. 490. Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege
longstanding, statewide deficiencies in the Idaho system, which result in actual and constructive
denial of counsel across the state. R., p. 7-8, para 1-2, p. 13-17, para. 8-21, p. 20-22, para. 3437, p. 25-26, para. 52-59, p. 37-52, para. 98-154. Absent from the court's reasoning is any
explanation of how individual counties (through their county commissioners) would have the
authority or practical ability to remedy these statewide deficiencies. That omission is
unsurprising, because the counties cannot provide a statewide remedy. Only state officials with a
sufficient connection to indigent defense delivery across the state-namely the PDC and the
Governor as its supervisor-are capable of providing such a remedy.

c.

Redressability

Like its treatment of the injury-in-fact inquiry, the court's redressability analysis is based
on a false premise. Rather than recognizing Plaintiffs' constructive denial of counsel theory of
the case and properly analyzing the case under Gideon and Cronic, the court viewed Plaintiffs'
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claims through the inapposite prism of Strickland. Contrary to the court's assertion, Plaintiffs are
not '·seek[ing] relief in their individual cases as well as in all other indigent criminal cases in
Idaho." R., p. 490. That request is nowhere to be found in Plaintiffs' prayer for relief. Plaintiffs
do not seek a case-by-case review of all criminal matters currently pending across the state.
Instead, Plaintiffs allege that the statewide indigent defense delivery system in Idaho is in such a
state of disrepair that "the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide
effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into
the actual conduct of the trial." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659---660; see also Phillips, p. 4 (allowing suit
to go forward upon finding that plaintiffs-indigent criminal defendants seeking prospective
relief from systematic deprivations of the right to counsel-were not, in doing so, challenging
individual convictions.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek a judgment from the Court declaring the
statewide system unconstitutional, and requiring the State to actually implement effective refonn.
Given that the Plaintiffs allege statewide, systemic deficiencies in Idaho's indigent
defense system (which must be taken as true for purposes of Defendants' motion to dismiss), and
the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition of constructive denial of counsel under Cronic, the task
before the Court is to detennine whether the injuries suffered as a result of those systemic
deficiencies are redressable. They are.
As the district court itself pointed out, under the law in effect at the time Plaintiffs filed
suit, the PDC was "saddled with the responsibility of creating rules regarding training and
education of defense attorneys and making recommendations to the legislature for improving
public defense in Idaho." R., p. 485. Moreover, under the amendments to Idaho's public defense
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statutes that will take effect on July 1, 2016, the PDC will now have authority to enforce
performance standards, LC. § 19-850( 1)(a)(vi), (vii), provide counties with supplemental
resources for the delivery of indigent defense services, LC. § 19-862A, and take responsibility
itseif for ensuring that the statutory standards are met, LC. § l 9-862A( 11 ). Standards like those,
if actually implemented and enforced, could directly remedy many of the deficiencies identified
by Plaintiffs in their Complaint.
The Governor, too, has the power to redress the alleged injuries, both by issuing
executive orders that can impact indigent defense and by exercising his "direct supervisory
authority over those responsible to establish standards for a constitutionally sound public defense
system." R., p. 485. The Governor has broad executive order authority that enables him to
influence statewide policies and procedures, including those relating to public defense. He has
recently used that authority to task an executive branch commission, the Idaho Juvenile Justice
Commission, with "ensur[ing] compliance" by local jurisdictions with the federal Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Act, including authorizing the commission to take "remedial actions for
violations." Idaho Exec. Order No. 2015-11 (Oct. 1, 2015). 3 Earlier this year, he empowered an
executive branch council to play an "expanded role" beyond its statutory authority and tasked it
with the duty of "[a]lign[ing] policy and funding systems." Idaho Exec. Order No. 2016-01 (Jan.
28, 2016). 4 The Governor has already created, by executive order, a state Criminal Justice
Commission (CJC) to identify challenges facing Idaho's criminal justice system and recommend
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solutions. Idaho Exec. Order No. 2015-10 (Sep. 23, 2015). 5 If other bodies and procedures are
failing to bring Idaho's indigent defense system up to constitutional muster, the Governor can
expand the CJC's role to include enforcement powers, as he has with the Idaho Juvenile Justice
Commission. See Idaho Exec. Order No. 2015-l l. The Governor, on his own, can and has taken
concrete steps to ensure that local and state government is complying with Idaho's federal and
constitutional responsibilities.
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that even under strict federal standing
requirements, it is enough that the "practical consequence" of a court decision "would amount to
a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redressed
the injury suffered." Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 464 (2002). In Evans, a court order for a new
report from the Secretary of Commerce that the President or Congress would likely abide by was
sufficient to establish standing. Id. at 463-464. Likewise, in Los Angeles Cty. Bar Ass 'n v. Eu,
the Ninth Circuit held that it was enough to show standing where the requested declaration
would likely prompt the California legislature to act, even though its members were not parties to
the case. 979 F.2d at 701. This Court, too, assumes that once it "fulfill[s] its constitutional duty to
interpret the constitution the other branches of government also will carry out their defined
constitutional duties in good faith and in a completely responsible manner." JSEEO I, 123 Idaho
at 583, 850 P.2d at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs' injuries are directly redressable by both the Governor and the PDC. To the
extent the Idaho Legislature (or this Comt in its administrative and rulemaking functions) could
5
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provide further relief, a declaratory judgment will ensure that it is sufficiently likely that any
other needed actions will be taken.

d.

Relaxed Standing Analysis Alternative

Because Plaintiffs have raised significant constitutional issues, this Court need not
conduct the full, federally based standing analysis detailed above. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL
7421342 at *4-*5; see also ISEEO v. Idaho State Ed. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276,284, 912 P.2d
644, 652 (1996) (recognizing "public interest exception" to justiciability doctrines). Despite
constitutional duties explicated by over fifty years of Supreme Court precedent since Gideon, the
State has yet to implement reform, even after the Governor stated unequivocally that Idaho's
public defense system is unconstitutional. Although the PDC has now been given greater
authority with the passage of 2016 House Bill 504, it still has not even complied with its
mandatory statutory requirements-enacted over two years ago-requiring it to promulgate rules
and issue recommendations. J.C.§ 19-850(l)(a), (b) (2014). The PDC has, in fact, already twice
failed to meet its explicit statutory deadlines. See l.C. § 19-850(l)(b) (2014).
The constitutional right to counsel at issue in this case could not be more fundamental.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "essential" to fair
trial, and that ·'if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not still be done."

Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (internal quotation marks omitted). If Plaintiffs cannot
bring this lawsuit, there will be no one to enforce this essential right against continued inaction
and delay by the PDC and other government officials. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL
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7421342 at *5. The circumstances presented in the Complaint in this case easily satisfy this
Court's public interest justiciability standards.

2.

Plaintiffs' Claims Are Ripe for Review.

Under Idaho law, a case is ripe if ''(l) litJ presents definite and concrete issues; (2) a real
and substantial controversy exists (as opposed to hypothetical facts); and (3) there is a present
need for adjudication." State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.3d 954, 958 (2005) (citing

Noh v. Cenarrusa, 13 7 Idaho 798, 80 I, 53 P.3d 121 7, 1220 (2002) ). Ripeness analysis, in other
words, "asks whether there is any need for court action at the present time." ABC Agra, LLC v.

Critical Access Grp., Inc., 156 Idaho 781, 783, 331 P.3d 523, 525 (2014) (internal citation
omitted). Where a future lawsuit would present no new facts or legal issues and it is clear that the
issue will be before the court either now or in the future, "a declaration now of the various rights
of the paities will certainly afford a relief from uncertainty and controversy in the future." Atiles,
116 Idaho at 643, 778 P.2d at 765.
"[W]here the facts of the case presently call for court action, this Court has held that an
actual controversy exists." ABC Agra, 156 Idaho at 784, 331 P.3d at 526. In Boundary

Backpackers v. Boundary County, for example, a challenge to a county ordinance that required
state and federal agencies to comply with the county's land use plan was ripe despite county
board members' testimony that they did not intend to enforce the ordinance. 128 Idaho 371, 376,
913 P.2d 1141, 1146. This Court has also held that claims may be ripe for adjudication even
where there is no immediately apparent damage. See, e.g., Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson,
394 F.3d 665, 671 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a contractual dispute was ripe for adjudication,
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even though the dispute prevented one of the parties from selling his property interest under the
contract, because there was "a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and rarity to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.")

Id. at 671. This Court held that a challenge to Idaho's Term Limits Act was ripe even before the
Act had taken effect. Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316, 92 P.3d 1063 (2002). The U.S.
Supreme Court has likewise made clear that a plaintiff need not wait for the threatened injury to
occur before seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat.

Union, 442 U.S. 289,298 ( 1979).
Yet in this case, the district court held that Plaintiffs had not established that there are
"definite, concrete issues and a real, substantial controversy" because none of Plaintiffs' criminal
cases had concluded. R., p. 493. The lower court believed thus that ·'the nature and extent of any
real or permanent injury cannot be determined at this time." R., p. 494. This analysis is flawed
for at least four reasons. First, the court was wrong that none of Plaintiffs' criminal cases had
concluded. See Part IV.B.1.a, above. Second, a plaintiff need not wait for the threatened injury to
occur before seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. E.g., Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298. Indeed, the
Court made clear in Ex parte Young itself that defense against criminal proceedings by claiming
a constitutional violation is not an adequate remedy, because of the gravity of the potential
penalty and because the ability to prove the violation in a criminal court "falls so far below that
which would obtain in a court of equity that comparison is scarcely possible." 209 U.S. 123, 165
(1908). The even graver risk here-one that actually happened to the lead plaintiff in this case-
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is that ongoing denial of counsel, especially to a criminal defendant awaiting trial in jail. will
effectively coerce a guilty plea.
Third, as explained above, the district court's conclusion relies on a case-by-case analysis
under Strickland and ignores the pre-adjudication injuries alleged by Plaintiffs under Cronic. In
other words, given the state of Idaho's indigent defense system, the present circumstances are "so
Iikely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particuiar case is
unjustified." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. Plaintiffs have specifically alleged definite and concrete
facts suggesting that the public defense system in Idaho is broken and in need of an urgent and
system-wide overhaul. The State itself has acknowledged the seriousness of Plaintiffs
allegations, R., p. 161, as has the district court, R., p. 492.
Fourth, none of Plaintiffs' allegations are hypothetical. The deficiencies described in the
Complaint are longstanding and have been recognized by state officials at every level. Indeed, it
is the recognition of those deficiencies that led to the state-requested assessment conducted by
the NLADA, R., p. 20, para. 31, the creation of the CJC's Public Defense Subcommittee, R., p.
24, para. 45, the establishment of a legislative study committee, R., p. 24, para. 45., and
legislative efforts to reform the system in 2014 and 2016, see R., p. 24, para. 45, including the
creation of the PDC, which was tasked with "creating rules regarding training and education of
defense attorneys and making recommendations to the legislature for improving public defense
in Idaho." R., p. 485. Plaintiffs also identified definite and concrete legal issues in the Complaint.
These include "[w]hether the State's failure to adequately fund and supervise the delivery of
indigent-defense services impedes the provision of effective legal representation to indigent
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defendants," "[w]hether the State's failure to develop uniform workload and performance
standards for public-defense attorneys in Idaho impedes the provision of effective legal
representation to indigent defendants," and, whether the structure of the statewide system and the
State's failure to appropriately fund, supervise, and administer the county-level systems violates
the right to counsel guarantees in the United States and Idaho constitutions. R., p. 35, para. 91.
As for the final prong of the ripeness inquiry, there is undoubtedly a present need for
adjudication, given that thousands of indigent defendants across the state-including the named
plaintiffs-continue to receive constitutionally-deficient representation as a result of Idaho's
broken system. It is incumbent upon the courts to step in and ensure that the State addresses
these ongoing injuries.

3.

The Separation of Powers Doctrine Does Not Apply in This Case.

The decision below also reaches the startling conclusion that Idaho's courts are powerless
to remedy statewide, systemic constitutional violations occurring daily in Idaho courtrooms. In
fact, the district court concluded that our courts will not even take evidence to determine whether
there is a statewide, systemic problem to start with. It decided that even to determine whether
Defendants are violating their direct, statutory and constitutional responsibilities would "invade
the province of the legislature" and "usurp the duties of the PDC." R., p. 496,492.
That is wrong. As this Court very recently reminded, "courts must refuse to aid and abet .
. . violations of the constitution." Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Lawrence Denney, No. 43169, 2015 WL
7421342, at * 14 (Idaho Nov. 20, 2015). "Thus, this Court has recognized that it has the power to
review the legislature's actions to ensure that they comply with constitutional requirements and
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that it is this Court's duty to remedy any violations.'' Id. Plaintiffs have alleged here that
thousands of Idahoans are being denied a fundamental constitutional right "as a result of the
State's failure to provide the necessary resources, robust oversight, and specialized training
required to ensure that ali public defenders can handle all of their cases effectiveiy and in
compliance with state and federal law." R., p. 12, para. 8. In addition to the constructive denial of
counsel claims discussed above, Plaintiffs specifically alleged ongoing, actual denials of counsel
at critical stages of the proceedings. R., p. 13-14, para. 11-12 Plaintiffs alleged, with
particularity, that these ongoing constitutional violations are due to failures at the state level that
the individual counties alone cannot remedy. R., p. 38., para., p. 12, para. I 02, p. 55, para. 10269, p. 26, para. 173, p. 57, para. 176, 180, p. 57, 183; cf p. 13, para. 12, p. 21, para. 36, p. 24,
para. 44, 46, 47, 48, p. 25, para. 49, 52, 54, p. 26, para. 57, 58, p. 33, para. 85, 86, 87, p. 34, para.
91, p. 36, para. 96 ..
The Idaho judiciary has a special and urgent responsibility to stop these ongoing
violations. Idaho's separation of powers doctrine has never been applied to avoid a constitutional
question that the Constitution has not explicitly assigned to another branch's exclusive
discretion. And never, this Court has made clear, may Idaho courts excuse themselves, on
separation of powers grounds, from examining the alleged violation of constitutionally protected
individual rights. The political branches have no discretion to violate those rights.

a.

Separation of Powers in Idaho.

The Idaho Constitution divides the powers of government of this state into the "three
distinct departments" of the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches. Idaho Const.
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Art. IJ, § I. This Court, more than 110 years ago, observed that, because of that separation of
powers, Idaho courts could not prohibit other branches from acting within the scope of their
exclusive domains. See Stein v. Morrison, 9 Idaho 426, 452-55, 75 P. 246, 255 (1904). "[O]n the
other hand," the Court expiained, "the iegal effect of such action after it has been taken may be
inquired into by the court." ld.,at 454, 75 P. at 255; accord Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567,
576, I 07 P. 493,495 (1910).
In the century since then, this Court has not hesitated to conduct those sorts of searching
inquiries. In the rare instance where our Constitution vests a particular branch with exclusive
discretion over a specific determination, the courts will not look behind the discretionary call
itself. But even in those unusual cases, the courts still retain their special role and authority to
examine and ensure the constitutionality of those decisions. "The question is whether this Court,
by entertaining review of a particular matter, would be substituting its judgment for that of
another coordinate branch of government, when the matter was one proper(v entrusted to that

branch." Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P. 2d at 761 (emphasis added). The
rare cases in which this has actually come up illustrate how these peculiar scenarios-where a
matter is entrusted exclusively to another branch-are a world apart from this case, which seeks
to vindicate a fundamental individual right:

•

Diefendorf v. Gallet: Article IV, § 9, of the Idaho Constitution expressly assigns

to ·'[t]he governor" discretion so that he "may" convene the legislature for a special
session by proclamation. Article III, § 15, likewise expressly grants discretion to "the
house where [a] bill may be pending" so that it "may" dispense with reading the bill three
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times before passage. Thus, when the governor acted within his '·exclusive province'' to
convene a special legislative session, and when the legislature took the "purely legislative
act" of skipping the extra readings, the Court had no authority to review those
discretionary calls. 51 Idaho 619,638,639, 10 P.2d 307,315 (1932). 6

•

Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy: Article III, § 22, contains a '·clear ... textually

demonstrable constitutional commitment to the legislature of the issue of determining
whether a sufficient emergency exists to necessitate immediate effectuation of
legislation." 110 Idaho 691, 695, 718 P.2d 1129, 1133 (l 986). Accordingly, the Court held
that it could not interfere with "the reasonable exercise by the legislature of powers
expressly delegated to it by the constitution of this state," absent some other
constitutional violation. Id. at 696, 1134.

•

Troutner v. Kempthorne: Article IV, § 6, which commits to the Idaho Senate the

discretion to grant or deny consent to a governor's nominee, "gives the Senate the sole
authority to pass upon the nominee's qualifications." 142 Idaho 389, 393, 128 P.3d 926,
930 (2006). Because of the express textual commitment of discretion to another branch.
this Court determined that it would not look behind the Senate's confirmation of a
nominee. Id.
6

Another case from the same era, Johnson v. Diefendm:f; 56 Idaho 620, 57 P.2d I 068 (1936), is
sometimes cited alongside Gallet in discussions of the separation of powers doctrine. But
Johnson is actually not a case in which the Court declined review on separation of powers
grounds. Rather, because both sides stipulated that a legislative emergency did exist in that case,
the question whether the legislature or the courts got to make the final call about the existence of
an emergency was not before the Court. Id. 56 Idaho at 638, 57 P.2d at 1076.
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On the other hand, absent express, textually demonstrable assignments of discretion to a
non-judicial branch, this Court has again and again refused to avoid a constitutional question on
separation of powers grounds:

•

Ingard v. Baker: Although the governor had constitutional discretion in selecting

nominees for public offices, the Court still reviewed the governor's nomination because a
statute limited that discretion. 27 Idaho 124, 138, 147 P. 293,298 (1915). Where the law
overlaid a duty upon that discretion, even so slight a duty as to consider an executive
agency's recommendations before making a nomination, the Court still intervened to
ensure the governor complied with that duty. Id.

•

Miles v. Idaho Power Co.: Again, because of legal duties overlying the political

branches' discretion, the Court intervened to review the Swan Falls Agreement between
the State and Idaho Power. 116 Idaho 635, 640, 778 P.2d 757, 762 (1989). This Court
held that, although the advisability of the agreement itself was a discretionary call for the
legislative and executive branches, deciding whether the agreement violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and counterpart guarantees in the Idaho Constitution was "a
fundamental responsibility of the judiciary." Id.

•

ISEEO v. Evans (ISEEO /): Even when faced with vague constitutional duties

calling for complicated interpretation, this Court will not defer to the political branches
when it comes to individual rights. 123 Idaho at 583, 850 P.2d at 734. This Court
acknowledged that it was "not well equipped to legislate in a turbulent field of social,
economic and political policy" in figuring out what the Idaho Constitution meant by a
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..thorough" public education. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) But the Court
nevertheless held that it would be "an abject abdication of [its] role in the American
system of government" to avoid the difficult task by invoking the separation of powers
doctrine. Id.

•

In re SRBA Case No. 39576: This Court reversed a lower court's conclusion that

the separation of powers doctrine foreclosed judicial decision of whether state agencies
could appear separately in the Snake River Basin Adjudication. 128 Idaho 246, 260-61,
912 P.2d 614, 628-29 (1995). Looking to the factors involved in the federal "political
question doctrine," laid out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the Court found
no justification for avoiding judicial review, especially because of the due process issues
implicated. In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 261,912 P.2d at 629.

•

Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney: This recent case involved the "validity of

enactments," one of the categories identified in Baker v. Carr as often raising separation
of powers issues. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 214. This Court noted the separation of
powers expressed in Article II, section I, of the Idaho Constitution, but explained that it is
nevertheless "axiomatic that each of the branches of government serves as a check
against the powers of the others to ensure that each branch is acting within the scope of
its authority and consistent with the Constitution." Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL
7421342 at* 13. The Court accordingly mandated constitutional compliance in the face of
executive branch inaction. Id. at * 18.
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As these cases demonstrate, the separation of powers doctrine rarely justifies withholding
judicial review, whether in federal or in Idaho courts. The district court erred in applying the
doctrine to preclude review of Plaintiffs claims in this case.

b.

Complying with the Sixth Amendment and Article I, § 13, of the Idaho
Constitution is Not a Discretionary Act.

The main principle to be distilled from the precedent set forth above is that the separation
of powers doctrine only limits judicial review of other branches' discretionary acts. In re SRBA

Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 261, 912 P.2d at 629. Where the Constitution has removed
discretion, the doctrine obviously does not apply. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL 7421342 at

* 14. The very purpose of the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Rights in Article I of Idaho's
Constitution is to eliminate the political branches' discretion and instead entrust the protection of
individual rights to an independent judiciary. See West Virginia S'tate Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624,638 (1943). Judge Donald Burnett, in his scholarly and concise way, explained this
principle:
Our system of government is said to embody a separation of powers. Actually, it
is more accurate to say that the three branches of government-legislative,
executive and judicial-have areas of exclusive and shared authority. Thus, the
legislature has exclusive authority, subject to constitutional restrictions, to
determine the internal processes by which it will formulate and consider proposed
statutes or resolutions. Similarly, the judiciary has exclusive authority, within
constitutional constraints, to determine the internal processes by which it will
perform fact-finding and law-stating functions of adjudication. These areas of
exclusive responsibility often are characterized as "procedure." On the other hand,
the legislature and judiciary share authority to define the rights and duties of
private persons vis-a-vis each other or of government vis-a-vis individuals. On
such issues, court rules or decisions may coexist with statutes so long as they do
not conflict. When there is a conflict, the judiciary defers to the legislature unless
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the issue is governed by the state or federal constitution. In that event the
judiciary 's constitutional interpretation will prevail.

State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 785-786, 735 P.2d I 089, 1096-97 (Ct. App. 1987) (Burnett, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
This Court does not have to look any further than Gideon v. Wainwright for confirmation
that the right to counsel is a fundamental right with respect to which the political branches have
no discretion to fall short. Assistance of counsel, the Gideon Court held, "is one of the safeguards
of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and
liberty.'' 372 U.S. 335, 343 (internal citation omitted). Presented with Florida's failure to
establish and fund an adequate system of providing counsel, the Gideon Court interpreted the
Constitution to nevertheless require it notwithstanding concerns of federalism and separation of
powers. The Court's decision required immediate, statewide action in Florida to remedy a sudden
constitutional crisis of daunting magnitude. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So.2d 299, 300 (Fla.
1963) (discussing remedies in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision). The counterpart to the
Sixth Amendment in Idaho's Constitution, at Article I, section 13, is likewise a fundamental,
individual right-not an exclusive or discretionary function of some other co-ordinate branch.

See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 7, 539 P.2d 556, 559 ( 1975); Bement v. State, 91 Idaho 388,
395, 422 P.2d 55, 62 ( 1966) (describing the right to counsel as "so important" that it is "the most
pervasive right of an accused" (internal citation omitted)).
There is, obviously, no "textually demonstrable commitment" of exclusive discretion
over this fundamental right in either the Sixth Amendment or the Idaho Constitution. See Idaho
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State AFL-CIO, 110 Idaho at 695, 718 P.2d at 1133. Instead, the text that guarantees the right to
counsel in both constitutions alludes, if anything, to the judiciary. Nor does the fundamental right
to counsel implicate the "political question doctrine" of Baker v. Carr, which is concerned with
questions that demonstrably fall within another branch's competence, such as foreign relations,
the guaranty of a "republican" form of government, and the status of Indian tribes. 369 U.S. at
211-19; see also State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 32 P.3d 325, 331-37 (Wyo. 200 I) (analyzing,
at great length, the separation of powers and political question doctrines to explain why judicial
review in cases alleging ongoing, statewide constitutional violations ·'is entirely consistent with
separation of powers and the judicial role.") Separation of powers and the political question
doctrine cannot be used as end-runs around judicial protection of constitutional rights. As the

Baker CoUJi itself explained, "such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an
instrument for circumventing a federally protected right," for "[i]t is inconceivable that
guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of
existence." 369 U.S. 186,231,230 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,345 (1960)).
The right to counsel is simply not a matter "properly entrusted to [some] other branch."

See Miles, 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761. This Court does not defer to another branch's
determination of constitutional adequacy absent a textually demonstrable assignment of
discretion to that branch. See In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 261, 912 P.2d at 629.
Even where the Constitution expressly delegates authority to another branch, the separation of
powers doctrine still does not absolve this Court of its fundamental responsibility to examine and
decide complaints alleging the violation of individual rights. See Miles, 116 Idaho at 640, 778
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P.2d at 762. The Complaint in this case raises serious questions involving fundamental individual
rights outside the discretion of any particular branch of government. Accordingly, the lower
court's dismissal on separation of powers grounds must be reversed.

c.

A Declaration and Injunction in This Case Would Respect Executive and
Legislative Independence.

In its separation of powers analysis, the district court expressed misplaced concern about
.. overrid[ing]" the indigent defense system that the legislature had chosen, and about
..reshap[ing] the system of indigent criminal defense in Idaho." R., p. 496. As a threshold matter,
this is more properly characterized as a redressability issue, which this brief covers in Part
IV.B.1.c. It is not truly a separation of powers issue because, as this Court has explained in its
own separation of powers decisions, the judiciary has a fundamental responsibility to override
other branches' failures to act and to remediate unconstitutional state systems. See Coeur d'Alene

Tribe, 2015 WL 7421342 at *14; ISEEO I, 123 Idaho at 583-84, 850 P.2d at 734-35; ISEEO v.
Evans, 142 Idaho 450, 459, 129 P.3d 1199, 1208 (2005) [hereinafter ISEEO V]; see also Hellar v.
Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 575, 585, 682 P.2d 524, 528, 538 (1984) (upholding declaratory
judgment invalidating legislative reapportionment and entering an order prescribing a specific
reapportionment plan).
In any event, the district court's worry about invading the province of the legislature by
overriding the existing system is an imagined one. By design, the remedy that Plaintiffs seek
respects the separation of powers. Plaintiffs ask for a declaratory judgment that Idaho's system
violates the right to counsel. R., p. 25, para. 53. Entering a declaration obviously does not require
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the court to "establish standards or guidelines,'' to "mandate" that any branch '·must enact ...
legislation, ordinances, or rules to meet those standards," or to order any branch to "provide
adequate funding therefore." R., p. 497. Rather, entering a declaration to resolve a question of
constitutionality is a core judicial branch duty. ISEEO V, 142 Idaho at 459, 129 P.3d at 1208.
Plaintiffs also seek an injunction requiring that the State develop and propose a plan to
implement a constitutional system. R., p. 25, para. 53. This remedy similarly would not require
the Court to impose standards, mandate enactment of legislation, or order appropriation of
additional funding. In crafting a constitutional system, the executive and legislative branches
would retain the full discretion preserved for them by the separation of powers. They, not the
courts, would develop Idaho-appropriate standards on their own. They, not the courts, would
determine whether new legislation would be best or whether, instead, the Governor and the PDC
would use their existing authority to impose reforms. See, e.g., LC. § 19-850 (effective July 1,
2016) (granting PDC authority to promulgate rules establishing standards for public defense);
Idaho Exec. Order No. 2015-11 (Oct. I, 2015) (tasking executive branch commission with
"ensur[ing] compliance" by local jurisdictions with the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Act, including through "remedial actions for violations"); Idaho Exec. Order no. 2016-0 I (Jan.
28, 2016) (granting an executive branch council an "expanded role" beyond its statutory
authority and tasking it with the duty of"[ a]lign[ing] policy and funding systems"). They, not the
courts, would decide whether these measures would require additional funding, the realignment
of existing funding, or whether to avoid funding issues altogether by measures to reduce the
overall case load of the entire criminal justice system, thus alleviating the burdens of prosecutors,
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the courts, and public defenders alike. 7 Further, as Ne,v York's highest court recognized in
Hurrell-Harring, the fact that the court's ruling may necessitate some action on the part of the
legislature does not absolve the court from issuing such a ruling:

It is, of course, possible that a remedy in this action would necessitate the
appropriation of funds and perhaps, particularly in a time of scarcity, some
reordering of legislative priorities. But this does not amount to an argument upon
which a court might be relieved of its essential obligation to provide a remedy for
violation of a fundamental constitutional right.
Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 227 (citing A1arbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803)).
The executive and legislative branches would, in every event, retain their independence.
The court would do nothing more than exercise its unique and critical role to make the ultimate
determination of constitutional compliance and enter any appropriate orders to set the other
branches into motion to correct deficiencies. This Court can assume that after it "fulfill[ s] [its]
constitutional duty to interpret the constitution the other branches of government also will carry
out their defined constitutional duties in good faith and in a completely responsible manner."
ISEEO I, 123 Idaho at 583, 850 P.2d at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, because the right to counsel directly involves the judiciary in its ongoing
supervision of the criminal justice system, it is inconceivable that the courts have no role in
7

A Pennsylvania state court case involving county-level indigent defense was dismissed in part
on separation of powers grounds. Flora v. Luzerne Cty., I 03 A.3d 125, 138 (Pa. 2014). The
plaintiffs in that case, however, sought a writ of mandamus explicitly requiring appropriation of
additional funding to the Office of Public Defender. Id. Plaintiffs in this case seek neither an
extraordinary writ nor an order expressly requiring appropriation of funds. See R., p. 25, para.
53. Moreover, the Pennsylvania decision is questionable authority, as the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has granted special permission for appeal, which is now pending. Flora v. Luzerne Cty.
118 A.3d 385 (Pa. 2015).
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policing the ongoing constitutionality of that system. Rather, this Court has an enhanced
responsibility to take remedial action in this case, which involves the daily activity before courts
throughout Idaho. The judiciary's responsibility is so direct and special when it comes to the
right to counsel that this Court could take remedial action on its own. See Gideon, 153 So. 2d at
300 (promptly adopting procedural rules to aid in compliance with the Supreme Court's opinion
in Gideon); In the Matter of the Adoption of New Standards fi>r Indigent Defense and

Certification

of

Compliance,

No.

25700-A-1004

(Wash.

June

15,

2012),

This Court has made clear, as courts across this country have done since Marbury v.

lvfadison was decided in 1803, that the legislature and governor are not the final arbiters of
whether their acts or omissions are constitutional. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL 7421342 at

* 14.

Though the Idaho Constitution prescribes a separation of powers, whenever there is a

constitutional violation, whether done "perversely" or by "honest mistake," "the remedy for such
violation exists, nevertheless." Id. Here, neither the Legislature nor the Governor can be allowed
to be the final arbiter of whether Idaho's public defense system is constitutional.

C.

The District Court Correctly Determined that Governor Otter and the Members of
the Idaho Public Defense Commission Are Proper Defendants in This Case.
The burden lies with the State of Idaho, not individual counties, to make certain that

indigent defendants' right to competent counsel is realized. The district court agreed:
"Unquestionably, the State is ultimately responsible for ensuring constitutionally-sound public
defense." R., p. 472. Because the State is ultimately responsible for protecting the right to
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counsel, the question is which state officials can be sued when the State fails to meet its
constitutional obligation under the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13. Under the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Young, state officials sued in their official capacities for
prospective or declaratory relief are not immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See

Ex

parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. Such officials may be liable so long as they have '·some
connection" to the enforcement or operation of the law in question. Id. Appellants named
Governor Otter and the members of the Idaho Public Defense Commission as defendants in this
case, because they have a direct and significant connection to the provision of public defense
services across this state, and have specific authority to take further steps to reform this state's
public defender system and bring it into compliance with the state and federal constitutions.
Here, even the district court agreed, concluding that "[ u]nder the Ex parte Young
doctrine, the Court finds that the Governor and the PDC members have a more than sufficiently
close connection or nexus to the enforcement of public defense in Idaho." R., p. 485.
Specifically, the court correctly pointed out that "[t]he Governor has a duty to ensure that the
Constitution and laws are enforced in Idaho. The Governor also has direct supervisory authority
over those responsible to establish standards for a constitutionally sound public defense system."
R., p. 485. The lower court also recognized the PDC's specific responsibility for creating training
and education rules and for recommending improvements to the legislature. R., p. 485. Most
importantly, the lower court correctly rejected the argument that the legislature's delegation of
public defender services to the counties abdicates the Defendants' responsibility to indigent
defendants in Idaho. Id.
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The State's, Governor's, and PDC's authority over public defense reform, and their
attendant ability to remedy the systemic deficiencies alleged in this case, has further increased in
the months since Plaintiffs filed suit. Defendant Otter, by his signature, enacted 2016 House Bill
504, which will empower the PDC to promulgate and enforce specific standards for the provision
of public defense services and will also require the PDC to monitor and evaluate whether each
individual county complies with those standards. I.C. § 19-850(1 )(a)(vii) (effective July 1, 2016).
The principles underlying those standards track the deficiencies that Plaintiffs identified in their
Complaint. See R., p. 3 7, para. 101. When and whether the PDC promulgates and enforces new
standards remains to be seen, but the enactment of House Bill 504 resolves any doubt that the
PDC and Governor have more than enough authority to remedy the Plaintiffs' grievances.
Governor Otter also allocated, and the Legislature appropriated, over $5 million of State
funding for trial-level public defense delivery across the state. See 2016 House Bill 609,
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/20 I 6/H0609.htm. Though this funding will not
nearly be sufficient to remediate this state's public defense system, the allocation does
demonstrate the Governor's authority to take concrete steps to reform the system.
The PDC, in turn, will now also have authority to provide some of this limited funding to
the counties to assist them in meeting the statutory requirements. I.C. § I 9-862A ( effective July
1, 2016). In the event that any county is unable or unwilling to take the steps necessary to come
into compliance with the statutory requirements, the PDC is ultimately responsible for
intervening and ensuring that the standards are met. LC. § I 9-862A( 11) (effective July 1, 2016).
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The PDC will even have the power to intercept county sales tax revenue to fund failing countylevel indigent defense systems. LC. § l 9-862A(l 2) (effective July 1, 2016).
These steps are not enough to guarantee that Idaho's public defense system passes
constitutional muster. The passage of this most recent legislation does not guarantee that the
system-wide deficiencies will be adequately addressed, particularly given the State's recent
history of enacting public defense legislation and then failing to carry out its statutory
responsibilities. The most recent legislation does clearly demonstrate, however, that the PDC and
the Governor had (and have) the ability to provide Plaintiffs with appropriate relief. Each
defendant in this case was and is connected to Idaho's public defense system and each is
responsible for ensuring that it is up to constitutional standards.

V. CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, this Court should reverse the lower court's decision dismissing
ading stage and remand so Plaintiffs can put on their proof.
Dated: April 29, 2016
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[K] Service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
[K] See attached copy of Tentative Ruling.

D

Judgment d e b t o r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - sworn and examined.
Judgment debtor
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - failed to appear.
8enc h warrant issued in the amount of$ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Judgment:

D Default D Other

Money damages
Principal

D

Claim of exemption

D

entered in the amount of:
Interest $- - - Costs $- - - - Attorney fees $
Total $ _ __
granted
denied. Court orders withholdings modified to $ ___ per _ __

---------

D

Further, court orders:

D
D
D
D
D

Monies held by levying officer to be
$

D

released to judgment creditor.

D

returned to judgment debtor.

to be released to judgment creditor and balance returned to judgment debtor.

Levying Officer, County of ___________, notified.
Notice to be filed within 15 days.

D Writ to issue

D Restitution of Premises
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Tentative Ruling

Re:

Phillips et al. v. State of California et al., Superior Court
Case No. 15CECG02201

Hearing Date:

April 12, 2016 (Dept. 501)

Motion:

(1) State of California and Governor Edmund Brown,
Jr.'s Demurrer

(2) State of California and Governor Edmund Brown,
Jr.'s Motion to Strike
(3) County of Fresno's Demurrer

Tentative Ruling:
(1) State of Callfornla and Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. 's Demurrer.
To sustain the demurrer to the petition and the entire complaint as to
Governor Brown, with leave to amend.
As to the State of California, to sustain the demurrer to the petition for writ
of mandate, with leave to amend. To sus.tain the demurrer to the fifth cause of
action with leave to amend. To overrule t.he demurrers to the first, second, third,
fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc.§
430.10.)
(2) State of California and Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. 's Motion to Strike.
To deny. {Code Civ. Proc. § 435.)

(3) County of Fresno's Demurrer. To sustain the demurrer to the petition for
writ of mandate, with leave to amend. To overrule the demurrers to the
complaint and each cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10.)
Plaintiffs are granted 20 days leave to file the first amended petition and
complaint. The time in which the pleading can be amended will run from
service by the clerk of the minute order. New allegations in the amended
pleading are to be set in boldface type. The parties shall meet and confer in
accordance with Code Civ. Proc.§ 430.41 (c).
In the amended pleading, plaintiffs shall separate and clearly distinguish
between the petition for writ of mandate and the complaint. The two should be
pied separately as independent pleadings, even if bound together in one
document.

Explanation:
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State of California and Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. 's Demurrer

Plaintiffs in this action filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint
("Complaint") against County of Fresno, the State of California and Governor
Brown, alleging that the Fresno County Public Defender's Office suffers from
systemic and structural deficiencies that prevent it from providing indigent
defendants with meaningful and effective assistance of counsel in violation of
the federal and California constitutional guarantees of due process and right to
counsel, and the constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial.
The State of California and Governor Brown will be referred to herein
collectively as "the State."
The State's responslblllty

Plaintiffs allege that the State has a "constitutional duty to run indigent
defense systems" (Complaint ,i 27); has delegated that duty to the counties; and
that the State "does not provide oversight" of the county systems and "leaves
counties to shoulder the financial costs." (Id. ,i,i 27, 29. 31.J
The State contends that the right to counsel does not prescribe any
affirmative duty on the State government to provide or run a particular indigent
defense system or distribution of government powers. (See, e.g., Marine Forests
Society v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 36 Cal.4th l, 30 ["The [federal]
Constitution does not impose on the States any particular plan for the distribution
of governmental powers;" citation omitted].) The State asserts that even if the
right to counsel placed an affirmative duty on the State government, the
Legislature has enacted a comprehensive system of indigent defense laws,
which safeguard the right to counsel. (See, e.g .• Avon v. Municipal Court for Los
Angeles Judicial Dist. (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 630, 632 ["The purpose of section 987a
[renumbered 987.2] of the Penal Code is to provide adequate representation for
indigent persons charged with crime]; People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 334,
344 [the constitutional right to counsel "is satisfied in California by the statutory
provision for the assignment of counsel by the court"].)
The State may be correct that Pen. Code§ 987.2 provides an effective
backstop to the right to counsel. But at the pleading stage the court cannot
determine that this system operates to provide effective assistance of counsel to
indigent criminal defendants.
The State contends that the Complaint does not allege that the State
failed to perform any specific statutory duty, and thus plaintiffs cannot allege a
cognizable as-applied claim against the State.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a provision of the Bill of Rights so
'"fundamental and essential to a fair trial"' that it "is made obligatory upon the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment." (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S.
2

335, 342-43, emphasis added.) The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause in turn provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." (US. Const, amend XIV (emphasis
added).)
The State argues that that the Fourteenth Amendment's reference to the
"State" does not does not place the responsibility for providing counsel on state
governments because the term the "State" refers to all public entities within the
states, at both the state and local levels, citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dept. of Social Services (1989} 489 U.S. 189, 195fn. 1.
That is not a holding of the DeShaney decision. The Court stated that that
the petitioners in that case "contend that the State [1] deprived Joshua of his
liberty interest ... " Footnote 1 reads, "As used here, the term 'State' refers
generically to state and local governmental entities and their agents." The Court
was merely defining the term as used in that opinion. It was not stating that the
term "State" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment refers generically to state
and local government entities. As the State points out in its reply brief, Gideon
did not address where the responsibility lies within states for providing counsel."
"It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered."
(People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 566.) The State cites to City of Lafayette,
La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (1978) 435 U.S. 389,415 fn. 43 for the same
proposition. This citation is not on point either.
The State cannot disclaim its constitutional responsibilities merely because
it has delegated such responsibilities to its municipalities. (See Duncan v.
Michigan (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) 774 N.W.2d 89, 97-98, 104-105.) In New York Cty.
Lawyers' Ass 'n v. State of New York (N .Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) 745 N.Y.S.2d 376,381,
the court issued a preliminary injunction in a case challenging New York's
compensation rate for appointed counsel and citing Gideon for the proposition
that "New York State bears the ultimate responsibility to provide counsel to the
indigent."
Nor can the State evade its constitutional obligation by passing statutes.
(See Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2010) 622 F.3d 1058, 1074 ["a State
cannot avoid its obligation under federal law by contracting with a third party to
perform its function"].) Counties are "subordinate governmental instrumentalities
created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental
functions," rather than "sovereign entities." (Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533,
575.)
Plaintiffs point to Stanley v. Darlington County School Dist. {4th Cir. 1996) 84
F.3d 707, an equal protection school desegregation case, where the State
argued that "the School District lacks standing to sue the State because the
School District is a political subdivision of the State and that the State's allocation
of governmental expenses is an internal issue of governmental structuring and
money." (Id. at pp. 712-713.) The court rejected this argument, stating,
"[b]ecause the Fourteenth Amendment imposes direct responsibility on a state
3

to ensure [due process] ... a state's delegation to a political subdivision of the
power necessary to remedy the constitutional violation does not absolve the
state of its responsibility to ensure that the violation is remedied." (Id. at p. 713.J
The State, here, distinguishes Stanley by pointing out that the decision did
not place responsibility upon states for violations by other governmental entities.
The court recognized "[a]t the outset of our discussion ... that illegal segregation
was for many years the policy of both the State of South Carolina and the
Darlington County School District." (/d. at p. 713.)
However, here, if the State created an indigent defense system that is
systematically flawed and underfunded, Stanley indicates that the State remains
responsible, even if it delegated this responsibility to political subdivisions. "Even
if a state gives its local school districts the power and means to remedy"
segregation, it can still be sued by the students in those districts for its failure to
take steps to dismantle a dual educational system that it created. (/d. at p. 713.)
The State has not produced authority clearly showing that the causes of
action premised on deprivation of the right to counsel have no merit. The court
will not sustain the demurrer on this ground.
Violation of Individual's Right to Counsel

The State next argues that the Complaint fails to state a claim for violation
of any individual's right to counsel.
The State contends that plaintiffs must satisfy the test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-94: in order to
prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show (1)
that an error by counsel was professionally unreasonable and (2) that there is a
reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different (i.e., prejudice).
However, plaintiffs in this action are not challenging individual convictions.
Rather, they claim 'that the State systematically deprives Fresno County indigent
defendants of the right to counsel. They contend that this right can be
vindicated through individual suits challenging the validity of particular criminal
convictions, or suits seeking prospective systemic relief where structural
deficiencies in an indigent defense system constructively deny the assistance of
· counsel.
Since no individual convictions are being challenged, the court will only
address the question of whether there is a claim of systemic deprivation .
.Plaintiffs correctly point out that mere token appointment of counsel does
not satisfy the Sixth amendment right to counsel. (Evitts v. Lucey (1985) 469 U.S.
387, 395.) "The Sixth Amendment requires effective assistance of counsel at
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critical stages of a criminal proceeding." (Lafler v. Cooper {2012) 132 S.Ct. 1376,
1385.J
Systemic violations of the right to counsel can be remedied through
prospective relief. The Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S.
335, held that states are obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to appoint
counsel for indigent criminal defendants. In Luckey v. Harris (11th Cir. 1988) 860
F.2d 1012, the Eleventh Circuit held that Strickland is an inappropriate standard
to apply in a civil suit seeking prospective relief. The court distinguished between
the standard used to determine "whether an accused has been prejudiced by
the denial of a right," which is an issue "that relates to relief," and the question of
"whether such a right exists and can be protected prospectively." (/d. at p.
l 017, emphasis added.) The court emphasized that prospective relief is
designed to avoid future harm; as such, "it can protect constitutional rights, even
if the violation of these rights would not affect the outcome of a trial." (Id.)
Prospective relief is designed to avoid future harm. [Citation.]
Therefore, it can protect constitutional rights, even if the violation of
these rights would not affect the outcome of a trial.
(/d. at p. 1017.)
In a suit for prospective relief the plaintiff's burden is to show the
likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the
inadequacy of remedies at law.... This is the standard to which
appellants, as a class, should have been held.
(Id. at p. 1018 (internal quotations omitted).)

Addressing the sufficiency of the allegations, the appellate court noted:
Appellants have alleged that systemic delays in the appointment
of counsel deny them their sixth amendment right to the
representation of counsel at critical stages in the criminal process,
hamper the ability of their counsel to defend them, and effectively
deny them their eighth and fourteenth amendment right to bail,
that their attorneys are denied investigative and expert resources
necessary to defend them effectively, that their attorneys are
pressured by courts to hurry their case to trial or to enter a guilty
plea, and that they are denied equal protection of the law~.
Without passing on the merits of these allegations, we conclude
that they are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
(Id. at p. 1018.)
Here, plaintiffs allege similar systemic deficiencies: excessive caseloads
(Complaint ,i,i 4, 50-52); Case management practices that create conflicts of
interest for attorneys (Complaint ,i,i 54, 58-59, 80); inadequate resources
(Complaint ,i,i 69, 75, 78-79, 82); inadequate supervision (Complaint ,i 95).
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Plaintiffs allege that these deficiencies cause the indigent defense system to
provide for representation that falls below minimum Constitutional and statutory
standards through inadequate preparation (Complaint ,i,i 54, 63, 80, 87-88); lack
of conflict-free legal representation (Complaint ,i,i 36, 48, 54, 64, 66-71, 79, 80, 95,
112); lack of continuous representation (Complaint ,i 63); inadequate
opportunity for consultation (Complaint ,i,i 64, 66, 68, 69-71 J; interference with
competent representation due to inadequate training and support from
supervisors (Complaint ,i,i 53, 60, 74, 75, 95, 97); inadequate factual investigation
(Complaint ,i,i 78-80); lack of meaningful adversarial testing (Complaint ,i,i 85,
87}.
Pursuant to Luckey, plaintiffs need not plead and prove the elements of
ineffective assistance as to specific individuals in order to state a cause of
action.
The State relies on Heck v. Humphrey (1994} 512 U.S. 477, 486, which held
that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a plaintiff seeking to collaterally
attack a criminal conviction, and that apart from habeas, civil actions "are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal
judgments."
The suit in Heck was brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for damages.
The Court held that to maintain a section 1983 suit for damages, the plaintiff must
prove that the conviction was invalidated. (Id. at pp. 486-487.) Heck does not
apply here because plaintiffs do not seek damages or relief that would imply the
invalidity of any convictions; rather they seek purely prospective relief.
Professional Guidelin~s

The State argues that alleged violations of professional guidelines are
insufficient to state a claim for violation of right to counsel. The State points out
that professional guidelines and norms such as those discussed in the Complaint
are not themselves constitutional standards or minimums, but are only guides to
determining what is reasonable. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
688.)
However, the Complaint does not hold these guidelines and standards
out as inexorable commands, but as evidence and guidelines. As indicated by
Strickland, cited by the State, professional guidelines and norms are relevant,
even if not dispositive. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688 [Prevailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like ... are
guides to determining what is reasonable ... "].)
Penal Code§ 987 (count S)

The fifth cause of action, asserting violation of Penal Code section 987,
fails against the State because the statute does not impose any duty on the
State. The statute provides that if a criminal defendant desires and is unable to
6

employ counsel, "the court shall assign counsel to defend him or her." (Pen.
Code§ 987(0).}
The only entity on whom a duty is imposed by section 987 is the court.
And it only requires that counsel be assigned to defend the defendant. The
Complaint does not allege any instance in which a court was required to
appoint counsel but failed to do so. Plaintiffs offer no argument as to how this
statute was violated. The demurrer to the fifth cause of action with leave to
amend.
Right to Speedy Trial ( counts 6-8)

The sixth cause of action alleges violation the California Constitution's right
to a speedy trial, and the seventh and eighth allege violation of two related
statues, Penal Code sections 1382 [sets forth statutory right to a speedy trial] and
859b [codifies the time for a preliminary hearing].
Plaintiffs allege that in Fresno, structural deficiencies in the indigent
defense system routinely force criminal defendants to face unreasonable delays
in their cases, in violation of their constitutional and statutory speedy-trial rights.
(Complaint ,i~ 6, 17, 98, 110, 112.)
Speedy trial rights can be infringed by deficiencies in the indigent defense
system. (See People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 571-72 [defendant's right
to a speedy trial may "be denied by failure to provide enough public defenders
or appointed counsel, so that an indigent must choose between the right to a
speedy trial and the right to representation by competent counsel"].)
The State points out that the right is a "personal" one, and "is waived if not
properly asserted by a defendant." (Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d
239, 251.) The State contends that for the same reasons set forth above, plaintiffs
cannot collaterally attack the pleas or sentences of the individuals identified in
the complaint. Citing to Heck, the State contends that a judicial declaration in
this case that any plaintiff was deprived the right to a speedy trial "would
necessarily imply the invalidity" of the proceedings against them, and thus is
barred. (Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 486.)
·
The cases cited the State sought retrospective relief that would overturn or
otherwise impugn the validity of convictions previously imposed. (See Heck v.
Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477 [suit for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983];
People v. Villaneuva 196 Cal. App. 4th 411 (2011) [direct appeal of conviction];
Gibbs v. Contra Costa County, No. C 11-00403 MEL 2011 WL 1899406 (ND. Cal.
May 19, 2011) [suit for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983} .) But here, plaintiffs
seek prospective relief based on the systemic violation of Fresno indigent
defendants' rights to a speedy trial and hearing. That relief would not overturn
the result in any individual criminal case. In Wilkinson v. Dotson (2005) 544 U.S. 74,
76, 82, the Supreme Court held that Heck did not bar state prisoners from
bringing a section 1983 claim challenging the constitutionality of state parole
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procedures where the prisoners sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
Accordingly, as with the right to counsel issue, Heck does not bar the speedy trial
claims since only prospective relief is sought, and plaintiffs are not seeking any
adjudications that would imply the invalidity of proceedings against any
individual defendant.
· Writ of Mandate

Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a), provides: "A
writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an
act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station .... " A writ of mandate "will issue against a
county, city, or other public body .... [Citations.]" (Venice Town
Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547,
1558, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 465.)
To obtain writ relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, the
petitioner must show there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy; the respondent has a clear, present, and ministerial duty
to act in a particular way; and the petitioner has a clear, present
and beneficial right to performance of that duty. (Morgan v. City of
Los Angeles Bd. of Pension Comrs. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 836, 842,
102 Cal.Rptr.2d 468.) A ministerial duty is one that is required to be
performed in a prescribed manner under the mandate of legal
authority without the exercise of discretion or judgment. (/d. at p.
843, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 468; Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees
(2001 J 93 Cal.App.4th 607, 618, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 309.)
(County of San Diego v. State (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 593 [fn omitted] .J
"A writ of mandate will lie to compel the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station
(citation) upon the verified petition of the party beneficially interested, in cases
where there is not a plain, speedy, and. adequate remedy, in the ordinary
course of law." (Ca/. Corr. Supervisors Org., Inc. v. Dep't of Corr. (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 824, 827 [citing Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085-1086, quotations omitted].)
"Two basic requirements are essential to the issuance of the writ: (1) A clear,
present and usually ministerial duty upon the part of.the respondent [citations];
and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance
of that duty[.]" (/bid.; see also Cal. Assn. of Prof Scientists v. Dept. of Finance
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236 [writ of mandate is to compel "the
performance of a clear, present, and ministerial duty where the petitioner has a
beneficial right to performance of that duty"].)
"A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a
prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without
regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act's propriety or
impropriety, when a given state of facts exists." (Ca/. Assn. of Professional
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Scientists v. Dept. of Finance (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236.) Mandamus "will
not lie to control an exercise of discretion, i.e., to compel an official to exercise
discretion in a particular manner." {Mooney v. Garcia (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th
229, 232-233.J

Plaintiffs identify no ministerial duty owed by the State or Governor.
While plaintiffs cite Jenkins v. Knight ( 1956) 46 Cal.2d 220, for the
proposition that "[t]he provisions of our Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory" (id. at p. 224), Jenkins did not rule that all constitutional provisions set
forth ministerial duties for purposes of mandamus. It addressed former article IV,
section 12, of the State Constitution, which provided that when vacancies arise
in the Legislature, the Governor "shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies." (Id. at p. 222.) This imposed a ministerial duty, because the Governor
was "commanded by the Constitution to issue a proclamation" and had l'no
discretion" in the matter. (Id. at p. 224.) Plaintiffs identify no ministerial duty
comparable to this one. Plaintiffs also cite Harn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24
Cal.3d 605, but Horn did not address what constitutes a "ministerial" duty for
purposes of mandamus. Finally, Molar v. Gates (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d l, involved
a challenge to specific practices of county officials, and the writ simply ordered
· them to end the practices. (/d. at p. 6.) Plaintiffs challenge no specific State acts
and instead allege only a general duty to comply the Constitution.
Additionally, mandamus cannot issue against the State. "The state acts
only through its officers or agents," and mandamus thus should be directed "to
compel an officer or agent of the state to perform an act that 'the law
specifically enjoins."' (County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164
Cal .App.4th 580, 593 n. 12.)
For these two reasons, the demurrer to the petition for writ of mandate
should be sustained. However, plaintiffs' tactic of commingling the petition for
writ of mandate with complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief makes it
somewhat difficult to fashion an order, as it is unclear whether plaintiffs intended
the various counts to be part of the petition or complaint. There is no distinction
in the pleading between petition and complaint. In the amended pleading, the
· two should be pied separately even if bound together in one document. .
The State also contends that the writ petition is not properly verified. A
petition for writ of mandate must be verified based on personal knowledge. (Civ.
Proc.§§ 1069, 1086, 1103(a}; Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 88
Cal .App.3d 201, 204.) The petition is verified only by Petitioner Phillips, not by
Petitioners Yepez or Estrada. Phillips verified only paragraphs 14-16 [describing
her residence and employment in background] of the Complaint based on
personal knowledge. The rest she verifies on information and belief.
However, Code of Civil Procedure section 446 (applicable to petitions for
mandamus by section 1109) provides that "[a] person verifying a pleading need
not swear to the truth or his or her belief in the truth of the matters stated therein
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but may, instead, assert the truth or his or her belief in the truth of those matters
'under penalty of perjury."' The verification is sufficient at the pleading stage.
Taxpayer Claim

The State next contends that the complaint fails to state a claim under the
taxpayer action statute. Two of the three plaintiffs, Phillips and Estrada, assert
claims as taxpayers under California's taxpayer-action statute, Code of Civil
Procedure section 526a (Claim 9). (See Complaint ,i,i 16, 20 [alleging taxpayer
standing].)
Section 526a provides that a taxpayer may bring "[a]n action to obtain a
judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or
injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of" a public entity. The "essence" of
the action, though, is "an illegal or wasteful expenditure of public funds or
damage to public property." (Humane Society of the US. v. State Bd. of
Equalization (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 349,355, citation omitted.) Therefore, to
survive demurrer, "the plaintiff must cite specific facts and reasons for a belief
that some illegal expenditure or injury to the public fisc is occurring or will occur."
(Ibid.)
However, "[i]t is immaterial that the amount of the illegal expenditures is
small or that the illegal procedures actually permit a saving of tax funds." (Wirin
v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890,894 [taxpayer suit proper in constitutional
challenge to practice of police conducting surveillance using concealed
microphones]; Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258,269 ["county officials may be
enjoined from spending their time carrying out" an unconstitutional statute, even
though that conduct "actually effect[s] a saving of tax funds"].}
The demurrer to count 9 should be overruled.

Governor Brown
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Governor Brown. The Complaint
alleges that Governor Brown has a duty to "see that the law is faithfully
executed" (Cal. Const. Art. I,§ l ), which includes a duty to ensure the State
respects the Constitutional and statutory provisions guaranteeing the right to
counsel.
No California or federal !aw does prescribes any role for the Governor in
ensuring the legal representation of indigent criminal defendants. The proper
defendant in a challenge to a state law or policy is the officer charged with
implementing the challenged measure. (Wolfe v. City of Fremont (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 533, 551.) The State points out that courts have issued writs to
compel action by the governor only when tied to a specific statutory or
constitutional duty directed to that office that leaves him no discretion, citing
Jenkins v. Knight (1956) 46 Cal. 2d 220, 224; Harpending v. Haight (1870) 39 Cal.
189, 209-10.)
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Plaintiffs cite four decisions for the proposition that the Governor is
routinely named in constitutional challenges, but those cases all involved specific
acts by the Governor or legal duties placed upon the Governor. (Hotel
Employees & Rest. Emp. lnt'I Union v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585,590 [Governor
was obligated to execute a gaming compact}; Cal. Correctional Peace Officers
Assn. v. Schwarzenegger (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 802, 808 [Governor's acts
pursuant to declared state of emergency]; Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52
Cal .3d 386; 340 [Governor charged with implementing challenged law]; Bd. of
Adm. v. Wilson {l 997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1119 [Governor's duties concerning
the budget process].)
This case presents no analogous circumstances. The demurrer to the
petition and complaint should be sustained as to Governor Brown.
State of California and Governor Edmund Brown, Jr.'s Motion to Strike
The State separately moves to strike paragraphs 11, 16, 18, 20, 114 and
115, each count of the Complaint, and each paragraph of the prayer for relief.
The State then offers no argument in its memorandum in support of moving to
strike any of these portions of the Complaint. It merely references the demurrer,
and asserts that each count is legally unsupportable. In other words, the motion
to strike basically says, "We move to strike everything. See demurrer." The State
points out that a motion to strike may be appropriate where a portion of a cause
of action is defective (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court ( 1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680,
1682-83), but the motion to strike identifies no portion of the complaint to be
stricken.
A motion must be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities.
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3. l l l 3(a).) The memorandum "must contain a
statement of facts, a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments
relied on, and a discussion of the statutes, cases and textbooks cited in support
of the position advanced." (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1 l l 3(b); see Quantum
Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Assocs., Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 934 [trial
court not required to "comb the record and the law for factual and legal
support that a party has failed to identify or provide"].) The memorandum in
support of the motion to strike fails in this regard. Neither the court nor plaintiffs
should be required to comb through the memorandum in support of the
demurrer for arguments supporting the motion to strike.
Moreover, the motion to strike is entirely duplicative of the demurrer,
which is being sustained as to any count that fails to state a cause of action.
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County of Fresno's Demurrer
Judicial Notice
For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the
demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate
facts alleged, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law].
(Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5
Cal.3d 584, 591 .) The sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts
pleaded state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. Thus, no
matter how unlikely or improbable, plaintiff's allegations must be accepted as
true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural
Materials Co. ( 1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) However, the allegations of the
complaint are not accepted as true if they contradict or are inconsistent with
facts judicially noticed by the court. The court may consider matters outside the
complaint if they are judicially noticeable under Educ. Code§§ 452 or 453. (See
Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal .App.4th 1462, 1474.)
In support of its demurrer the County of Fresno presents the most
expansive and excessive request for judicial notice ever seen by this court. The
County treats its demurrer as a plaintiff's opposition to a defendant's summary
judgment motion, but in this case expecting to have the case dismissed by
raising triable issues of fact.
The County's requests for judicial notice goes so far beyond the proper
reasonable use of procedure, that they are denied in their entirety pursuant to
Evidence Code section 352:
It is well recognized that the purpose of judicial notice is to
expedite the production and introduction of otherwise admissible
evidence .... the matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant .
. . . judicial notice [is] likewise qualified by Evidence Code, section
352, which permits the exclusion of any otherwise relevant
evidence in the discretion of the trial court 'if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading
the jury."
(Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 565, 578.)

Writ of Mandate
The County contends that the writ petition is demurrable because the
County Board has no ministerial duty to ensure that Public Defenders' caseloads
do not exceed any particular caseload cap number.
Traditional mandate will issue to compel action by a governmental body
or official when the action is a ministerial duty- one which a public agency is
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required to perform. (Women Organized for Employment v. Stein (1980) 114
Cal.App.3d 133, 139 .)
"A 'ministerial duty' is one generally imposed upon a person in public
office who, by virtue of that position, is obligated 'to perform in a prescribed
manner required by law when a given state of facts exists. [Citation.]'
[Citations.]" (City of King City v. Community Bank of Central California (2005) 131
Cal.App.4th 913, 926.J It is a duty that a governmental or private body, by or
through a public or private board, agency, official, or employee, is required to
perform without the exercise of independent judgment or opinion. (Ellena v.
Department of Ins. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 198, 205.) Ministerial actions "'are
essentially automatic based on whether certain fixed standards and objective
measurements have been met."' (Sustainability of Parks, Recycling & Wildlife
Legal Defense Fund v. County of Solano Dep't of Resource Mgmt. (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 1350, quoting Calvert v. County of Yuba (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 613,
623.J In general, a ministerial act does not entail the exercise of judgment or
discretion. "A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform
in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and
without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act's propriety or
impropriety, when a given set of facts exists." (California Ass'n of Prof. Scientists v.
Department of Fin. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236, quoting Kavanaugh v
West Sonoma County Union High Sch. Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.)
Plaintiffs cite to case law in which a writ of mandate issued to compel the
performance of a constitutional duty, and argue that the cases stand for the
proposition that manda.te will issue notwithstanding a governmental actor's
discretion.
In Molar v. Gates (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d l, the county permitted male
prisoners to access minimum security jail facilities with their attendant privileges,
while denying such facilities and privileges to female inmates. (/d. at p. 6.) The
petitioners sought a writ of mandate challenging this practice. Though the court
acknowledged that county officials have discretion in this area, it held that this
discretion did not preclude mandamus relief to remedy a violation of
constitutional equal protection rights. (Id. at pp. 19, 20, 23, 25.)
However, this case does not aid plaintiffs. While the county had discretion
whether "to provide minimum security facilities or outdoor work opportunities at
all" (id. at 25), once a facility or privilege was offered to the male inmates, the
county was mandated, under equal protection principles, to offer it to female
inmates as well. That was reflected in the language of the writ "to refrain from
providing facilities and programs to one sex which are not provided to the other
and to provide like criteria in offering branch jail privileges to the two sexes ... "
(/d.) Hence, in Molar, once the county made any discretionary decision to
provide facilities or privileges to one gender of inmates, the county had
absolutely no discretion to refuse to provide facilities or privileges to the other.
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Plaintiffs rely on Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, where the
plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the constitutionality of the
county's procedures for notifying landowners of governmenta l conduct
affecting their property interest. The issue before the court was whether the
board's action in approving the subdivision map was legislative {requiring no
notice to landowners) or adjudicatory (requiring notice to landowners) in nature.
The Subdivision Map Act mandates rejection of a subdivision plan "if it is deemed
unsuitable in t'?rms of topography, density, public health and access rights, or
community land use plans." (Id. at pp. 614-615.) The court noted that resolution
of these issues involve exercise of judgment and balancing of conflicting
interests, hallmarks of the adjudicative process. The court rejected the concept
that subdivision approvals are purely ministerial acts requiring no precedent
notice or opportunity for hearing. {/d. at p. 615.) Therefore, the petitioner was
entitled to notice. {/d.]
Plaintiffs rely on Horn because the California Supreme Court granted the
plaintiffs' writ, despite finding that the challenged conduct involved the exercise
of judgment and was not a purely ministerial act. But the discussion of
discretionary versus ministerial acts did not involve the mandate to provide
notice, but whether notice was required in the first place (i.e., whether it was an
adjudicatory decision). Horn is not supportive of plaintiffs' position here. Clearly
there is a constitutional duty, but it does not appear to be a ministerial duty. For
that reason the demurrer to the petition for writ of mandate should be sustained.
The County also argues that Penal Code section 987.2(a) provides for a
Sixth Amendment backstop, because it permits the public defender to decline
cases for "any ... ", which could include workload.
When a public defender reels under a staggering workload ... [t]he
public defender should proceed to place the situation before the
judge, who upon a satisfactory showing can relieve him, and order
the employment of private counsel (Pen.Code, s 987a) at public
expense.
{Ligda v. Superior Court ( 1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 811, 827-28.)
It is possible that Penal Code§ 987.2(a) (3) ensures protection of the right
to counsel, and renders plaintiffs' claims of systemic deficiencies in the indigent
criminal defense system meritless. But such a determinatio n would require a
much more detailed record and level of review than can be afforded at this
stage.
The County also contends that the petition is speculative because
plaintiffs rely upon isolated acts to assert the existence of a systemic problem.
While plaintiffs do give examples, they are not the only allegations
supporting the ultimate allegations of denial of right to counsel. The County
complains that while 42,000 criminal cases are initiated in this court every year
(Complaint ,i 40), plaintiffs give a mere six examples of alleged Sixth Amendment
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violations (Complaint ,i,i 98-112). Plaintiffs do not need to allege more than that
in the Complaint. "[T] he complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a
cause of action; each evidentiary.fact that might eventually form part of the
plaintiff's proof need not be alleged." (C.A v. William S. Hart Union High School
Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) If anything, the Complaint alleges too many
facts and statistics. The demurrer will not be sustained on the ground that the
examples pied are insufficient to establish systemic deficiencies. The County
relies on Rizzo v. Goode (1976} 423 U.S. 362, for the proposition that plaintiffs'
showing of a relatively few instances of violations by individual peace officers,
without any showing of a deliberate policy, did not provide a basis for injunctive
relief. But Rizzo did not involve an attack on the complaint. It was an appeal of
orders entered after parallel trials of separate actions. It does not address what is
required at the pleading stage.
The County continues to attack the existence of systemic deficiencies by
contending that the writ petition is speculative because per-attorney caseloads
cannot be reliably predicted, and because the Office's increasing capacities to
handle work should be the result of recently-expanded PD training budgets. The
County points to Proposition 47 (requiring misdemeanor sentence instead of
felony sentence for certain offenses, the full impacts of which are not yet
known), new positions added since the low point of the Great Recession,
increase in the training budget. Basically, the County contends that the
Complaint is speculative because there have been some changes, and
caseloads could change in the future. The Complaint alleges many structural
deficiencies in the indigent defense system: excessive caseloads (Complaint ,i,i
4, 50-52); Case management practices that create conflicts of interest for
attorneys (Complaint ,i,i 54, 58-59, 80); inadequate resources (Complaint ,i,i 69,
75, 78-79, 82); inadequate supervision (Complaint 1195). Plaintiffs allege that
these deficiencies cause the indigent defense system to provide for
representation that falls below minimum Constitutional and statutory standards
through inadequate preparation (Complaint 111154, 63, 80, 87-88): lack of
conflict-free legal representation (Complaint ,i,i 36, 48, 54, 64, 66-71, 79, 80, 95,
112); lack of continuous representation (Complaint ,i 63); inadequate
opportunity for consultation (Complaint 1111 64, 66, 68, 69-71 ); interference with
competent representation due to inadequate training and support from
supervisors (Complaint ,i,i 53, 60, 74, 75, 95, 97); inadequate factual investigation
(Complaint ,i,i 78-80); lack of meaningful adversarial testing (Complaint ,i,i 85,
87). These allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Fresno County under
counts one through five and nine for systemically depriving Fresno County
indigent defendants of assistance of counsel, despite the factual disputes raised
by the County.
Separation of Powers

The County then argues that the writ petition is demurrable because it
requires the court to violate the separation of powers doctrine.
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"Managing a county government's financial affairs has been entrusted to
... [the] county board of supervisors, and is an essential function of the board."
(Citizens for Jobs ahd the Economy v. County of Orange (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th
1311, 1332-1333.} The County contends that the Board had to balance the
budget during the Great Recession, and in doing so had to limit the number of
employees. That power was vested in the board of supervisors. (See Hicks v.
Board of Supervisors ( 1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 228, 234.)
However, authorities cited by the County indicate that the separation of
powers issue is not a hard-and-fast bar to the relief sought here. The County cites
to Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Authority (1953) 40 Cal.2d. 317,330:
[T)o state a cause of action warranting judicial interference with
the official acts of defendants, [the plaintiffs] must allege much
more than mere conclusions of law; they must aver the specHic
facts from which the conclusions entitling them to relief would
follow.
This citation indicates it becomes more of a sufficiency-of-the-pleading
issue. Moreover, the County's reply shifts the separation of powers argument
somewhat. Instead of arguing simply that the cannot issue the orders requested
because it would violate the separation of powers doctrine, it argues in the reply
that even if the Strickland test for violation of the right to counsel does not
apply 1, and plaintiffs are not required to plead and prove prejudice, plaintiffs are
still required to allege actual injury.
In the reply, the County argues that two cases apply the Strickland test in
the context of Sixth Amendment systemic deficiency claims: Platt v. State (1996}
664 N.E.2d 357 and Kennedy v. Carlson ( 1996) 544 N. W.2d 1, 7.
In Platt, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the Marion County public defender
system on the ground that it effectively denies indigents the effective assistance
of counsel. The court found the claim for equitable relief inappropriate because
a violation of a ·Sixth Amendment right will arise only after a defendant has
shown he was prejudiced by an unfair trial, relying on Strickland. "This prejudice is
essential to a viable Sixth Amendment claim and will exhibit itself only upon a
showing that the outcome of the proceeding was unreliable. Accordingly, the
claims presented here are not reviewable under the Sixth Amendment as we
have no proceeding and outcome from which to base our analysis." However,
1 This was discussed above in the State's
demurrer. Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 691-94 held that in order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a
defendant must show (1) that an error by counsel was professionally unreasonable and (2) that
there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different (Le., prejudice). I agreed with plaintiffs that, pursuant to
Luckey v. Harris {11th Cir. 1988) 860 F.2d 1012, the Strickland standard does not apply since
plaintiffs are seeking prospective relief.
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I'm not clear on the procedural posture of the case. And there is no mention of
Luckey.
Kennedy was a suit by a chief public defender, contending that the
public defender funding system violates the constitutional rights of indigent
criminal defendants to the effective assistance of counsel by not providing
sufficient funds for the operation of the Fourth Judicial District Public Defender's
Office. "[C]onstrained by Minnesota's caselaw and the facts before us in this
case," and because the plaintiff failed to show "injury in fact" to support his
claim "as required under Minnesota law," the court rejected his request for
judicial intervention.

The appeal was of the district court's order granting the plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment. "The court acknowledged that it could not determine
whether Kennedy's attorneys had provided ineffective assistance of counsel in
any particular cases, but nevertheless found that judicial relief was necessary to
prevent this from occurring in the future."
This decision was reversed on appeal. The appellate court did not apply
Strickland, but the state's law regarding the requir13ment of a justiciable
controversy in order to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the
constitutionality of a statute. The court held that there was no justiciable
controversy. Moreover, the appeal was of a decision fully evaluating the
evidence in support of the claims being raised, not an attack on the pleadings.
Furthermore, the court stated:
In those cases where courts have found a constitutional violation
due to systemic underfunding, the plaintiffs showed substantial
evidence of serious problems throughout the indigent defense
system. By comparison, Kennedy has shown no evidence that his
clients actually have been prejudiced due to ineffective assistance
of counsel. To the contrary, the evidence establishes that ·
Kennedy's office is well-respected by trial judges, it is well-funded
when compared to other public defender offices, and its attorneys
have faced no claims of professional misconduct or malpractice.
Here, there are plenty of allegations of negative consequences of the
systemic deficiencies alleged. As the County points out in its reply, in Luckey v.
Harris (11th Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[i] n a suit
for prospective relief the plaintiff's burden is to show 'the likelihood of substantial
and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law."' It
did not say that irreparable injury must be shown to have already occurred,
which is what the County is arguing.
In the reply the County also relies on Lewis v. Casey (1996) 518 U.S. 343 in
support of the contention that plaintiffs seeking systemic relief must plead and
prove actual injury. The United States Supreme Court has "consistently required
States to shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful
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access to the courts." (Bounds v. Smith (1977) 430 U.S. 817, 824.J In Lewis, the
Supreme Court concluded, however, that actual injury is required to state a
claim for denial of access to the courts. (518 U.S. at pp. 351-352.J Such injury will
be shown when an inmate can "demonstrate that a non-frivolous legal claim
has been frustrated or was being impeded." (/d. at p. 353.) The Court likewise
rejected the argument that the mere claim of a systemic defect, without a
showing of actual injury, presented a claim sufficient to confer standing. (/d. at
p. 349.J
While this is a compelling argument, the demurrer will not be sustained on
this ground for the multiple reasons. First, the County's moving papers never
argue this pleading injury requirement in the context of separation of powers.
The court may refuse to consider new evidence or arguments first raised in reply
papers, or it may grant the other side time for further briefing. (See Jay v.
Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-1538 ["The general rule of motion
practice ... is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers"].) Making
the argument for the first time in the reply deprived plaintiffs of the opportunity to
address it in their opposition. Second, Lewis arose from a different body of law
{access to the courts) than is applicable here. Luckey, which arises in the
context alleged deficiencies in provision of indigent defense services, does not
require plaintiffs seeking prospective relief to show injury. Third, the appeal was
of an injunction issued after a three-month bench trial. It was not an attack on
the pleadings. The Court in Lewis found that the plaintiffs in that case had not
set forth sufficient evidence to support a conclusion of systemwide violation and
imposition of systemwide relief. (Lewis, supra, 518 U.S. at pp. 359-60.) Here, such
a determination is premature. Fourth, plaintiffs allege that indigent defendants
regularly experience wrongful conviction of crimes, guilty pleas to inappropriate
charges, waiver of meritorious defenses, compelled waiver of right to speedy
trial, harsher sentences than the facts of the case warrant, and waiver of appeal
and post-conviction rights. (Complaint ,i 98.) Plaintiffs allege that Yepez suffered
harm as a result of deficiencies in the County's public defense system.
(Complaint ,i,i 99-106.J This and other examples (Complaint ,i,i 107-112) allege
injury.
Unclean hands

The County contends that the writ petition is demurrable as to Petitioner
Yepez, relying on the doctrine of unclean hands and judicial notice of records
related to plaintiff Yepez's criminal case. However, as noted above, the request
for judicial notice of these records is denied. Even if the request were granted,
the court could not conclusively say on such a scant record that allegations as
to Yepez are false.
Other Available Remedies

The County contends that the writ petition is demurrable because
plaintiffs have other remedies.
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Where the primary right of a plaintiff is of a legal and not an equitable
nature, and where a remedy for the invasion of that right is provided by law,
equitable relief will not be granted if the legal remedy is adequate and capable
of affording the plaintiff a complete measure of justice. (Philpott v. Superior
Court (1934) 1 Cal.2d 512.) To be entitled to equitable relief in such
circumstances, the plaintiff must show that he or she cannot obtain adequate or
complete relief qt law. (Id.) Equity will refuse to come to a plaintiff's assistance
when he or she has lost his or her legal remedy by failing to take advantage of it
where possible. (Hogan v. Horsfall (1928) 91 Cal.App.37.J
The County primarily focuses its unclean hands arguments on Yepez. For
the reasons discussed above, the court will not sustain any demurrers based on
the requests for judicial notice.
Moreover, an alternative remedy is only adequate if "it is capable of
directly affording and enforcing the relief sought" in the writ. (Dutton v. Daniels
(1923) 190 Cal. 577, 582.) Avenues for individual recourse are not an adequate
alternative in suits seeking systemic relief for "wholesale deficiencies." (See Knoff
v. City and County of San Francisco (1969) [rejecting argument that taxpayers
should have pursued individual challenges to assessments of their own properties
in writ action challenging misconduct in tax assessor's office].) As in Knoff,
plaintiffs have pied individual examples "as symptomatic of the much broader
problem the action is designed to relieve." Plaintiffs in this action do not seek to
relieve the Public Defender as counsel in any particular case, but to correct
wholesale deficiencies in the indigent defense system. Since a Marsden motion
would provide relief only to the individual who filed it, that alternative is not
capable of directly affording a systemic remedy. Accordingly, any failure by
Yepez failure to file a Marsden motion does not render the writ petition
demurrable.
The County argues that the writ petition is demurrable because injunctive
relief. also sought in the Complaint, is an adequate remedy. The fact, however.
"that an action in declaratory relief lies ... does not prevent the use of mandate."
(Brock v. Superior Court ( 1952) l 09 Cal. App. 2d 594, 603; accord Glendale city
Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale ( 1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 343 n.20 [citing
Brock].) "Where relief is sought against a public body, however, the availability
of injunctive relief is not a bar to mandate. (Ca/. Teachers Assn. v. Nielsen (1978)
Cal.App.3d 25, 28-29, citing County of L.A. v. State Dept. Pub. Health (1958} 158
Cal.App.2d 425,446, and Brock, supra.) For the first time in its reply, the County
cites to authority addressing this point. However, none of the authority cited
indicates that dismissal of a petition for writ of mandate is warranted for the
simple reason that injunctive relief is also sought.
Taxpayer Standing

The County argues that plaintiffs Phillips and Estrada lack taxpayer
standing.
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The County argues, like the State, that plaintiffs are not alleging wasteful
or illegal expenditure of public funds; rather, they allege that not enough money
is devoted to public defense. However, "[i]t is immateiial that the amount of the
illegal expenditures is small or that the illegal procedures actually permit a saving
of tax funds." (Wirin v. Parker (1957} 48 Cal.2d 890, 894 [taxpayer suit proper in
constitutional challenge to practice of police conducting surveillance using
concealed microphones]; Blair v. Pitchess (1971} 5 Cal.3d 258,269 ["county.
officials may be enjoined from spending their time carrying out" an
unconstitutional statute, even though that conduct "actually effect[s] a saving
of tax funds."]) Thus, I would reject this particular attack on plaintiffs' taxpayer
standing.
The County argues that plaintiffs lack taxpayer standing because the
relief sought would violate the separation of powers doctrine. It argues that it
would violate the separation of powers doctrine because plaintiffs attack the
Board's discretionary budgetary decisions. The County contends that Thompson
v. Petaluma Police Department (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 101, 106, introduced
separation of powers into the taxpayer standing issue by stating, "Courts should
not interfere with a local government's legislative judgment on the ground that
its funds could be spent more efficiently." However, the court never explicitly
addressed or applied the separation of powers doctrine. For application of this
concept, the County relies on San Bernardino County v. Superior Court (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 679. However, San Bernardino County does not discuss
separation of powers doctrine either.
In San Bernardino County, taxpayer organizations brought suit challenging
a settlement agreement between the County and a private entity after a former
county supervisor pied guilty to receiving bribes from the private entity in
exchange for his vote approving the 2006 settlement agreement. The taxpayer
organizations sought to have the settlement agreement declared void under the
state law governing conflicts of interest of government officials. The County
demurred on the grounds that the taxpayers lacked standing to bring the suit.
The taxpayer organizations argued that they had standing under section 526(a).
The trial court overruled the County's demurrer and the County filed a writ
petition regarding the denial of its demurrer. The court of appeal for the Fourth
Appellate District disagreed with the trial court, rejecting the taxpayer
organizations' standing theories. (Id. at pp. 684-688.) The court held that
"[t]axpayersuits are authorized only if the government body has a duty to act
and has refused to do so. if it has discretion and chooses not to act, the courts
may not interfere with that decision." (/d. at p. 686, internal citations omitted.)
Here, the County clearly has Constitutional duties to provide effective
counsel for indigent criminal defendants. It has acted, but allegedly not in a
manner that satisfies the Constitutional command. San Bernardino County
addresses situations where the governmental body has the discretion whether or
not to pursue legal action. The court found that there was no provision of law
requiring it to pursue any claim. (/d. at p. 687.) For that reason the plaintiffs did
not have taxpayer standing. (Id. at p. 688.) The case is not instructive on the
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issue of whether plaintiffs in this case have standing to sue as taxpayers in this
case. The demurrer on this ground will be overruled.
Pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3. l 312(a) and Code Civ. Proc.§
l 019 .5{a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this
tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will
constitute notice of the order.
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